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Introduction
Average per capita income nearly doubled between 1970 and 2000 (Barro and
Sala-i Martin, 2004, p. 7), but not all people gained from this overall income
growth. The economic development has been associated with a rapid rise in the
use of natural resources with unintended side effects like climate change. Com-
mon observations related to climate change are more extreme weather events.
These are especially devastating for the global poor, because those who did not
gain from overall economic growth often rely on natural resources for an in-
come, face lower insurance possibilities against adverse shocks and have less
income alternatives mainly due to missing education.
As climate change effects and strategies human kind deal with them are not yet
entirely known, restricting carbon emissions serves as an insurance against ad-
verse shocks. So far, negotiations on the precise climate policy measures and on
their timing are not yet finalized. Furthermore, to include the poor into global
prosperity and to make them less vulnerable to adverse shocks from climate
change, one could increase education and make income alternatives as well as
insurances available. Again, the debate on successful strategies to do so is not
yet completed.
This dissertation contributes to these on-going discussions in three papers. The
first paper deals with the timing of climate policy. The second paper analyzes
informal credit markets and their role for education with resulting income al-
ternatives in poor economies. The third paper adds to the comprehension of
risk sharing in informal credit contracts in developing countries.
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As limiting emissions to reduce climate change is a global challenge, politics
try to reach international agreements. International political decision making
processes and bureaucratical policy implementations take time, which implies
that climate policy, say a tax on emissions, can only be implemented with a cer-
tain time lag between announcement and implementation. This time lag may
cause the well-intended policies to actually make matters worse such that a do-
nothing policy would be preferable. Why is that? Resource owners anticipate
the future restrictions on carbon emissions and increase their current resource
supply at a lower price as compared to a no-intervention scenario. Thus, lagged
implemented climate policy increases emissions during the ‘announcement pe-
riod’, the period between the credible commitment to climate policy and its
actual implementation. This effect is termed ‘announcement effect’ or ‘weak
green paradox’ (Gerlagh, 2011).
The discussion on well-intended environmental policies that lead to the oppo-
site due to market imperfections was brought up by Sinn (2008) a few years
ago. Since then, a large body of theoretical papers emerged that found a (weak)
green paradox for different settings. What really matters though is not only the
existence of a weak green paradox, but the overall welfare effect of the lagged
implemented policy. In principle, this adverse announcement effect could more
than outweigh in welfare terms the gain from lower emissions after tax imple-
mentation. It is a priori not clear if the initially higher emissions (announce-
ment effect) or the lower emissions once the policy takes effect compared to
a no-intervention scenario dominate the overall welfare effect. This is espe-
cially true if one takes into account that climate dynamics, i.e. the diffusion of
emitted carbon from the atmosphere into other reservoirs, are relatively slow.
As carbon remains relatively long in the atmosphere, it may not matter if it is
emitted today or tomorrow. Even though the adverse announcement effect is
theoretically well established, it could turn out to be a theoretical curiosity if
it is quantitatively not relevant. Furthermore, given it matters quantitatively,
it may be interesting to know how much time there actually is to implement
welfare enhancing climate policy after announcing it.
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This is the issue of the first paper of my dissertation. It evaluates the welfare
effect of announced climate policy that is only implemented with a known time
lag due to political procedures. It shows for the first time that the adverse an-
nouncement effect of climate policy is not only a theoretical curiosity but also
quantitatively relevant in state-of the art models. In a numerical simulation,
the paper quantifies a ‘window of opportunity’ such that implementation be-
fore (after) its end is a welfare gain (loss) over the no-intervention scenario.
The model is a Ramsey model extended by an exhaustible carbon resource and
linked to a stylized dynamic climate model adapted from Nordhaus (2008b).
The policy is a carbon emissions tax whose time path is chosen optimally at the
time when implemented. The result is highly sensitive to assumptions on the
available resource stock which is afflicted with particular empirical uncertain-
ties. The central estimate is a window of opportunity of about 60 years. Hence,
there is still time to act, but the window of opportunity may be smaller.
The paper is joint work with Johannes Bröcker. He developed the research ques-
tion and the baseline model idea, while I did the literature research, the calibra-
tion and implementation of the different model versions as well as the presenta-
tion of the analysis and the results. I presented the work at the Brown Bag Sem-
inar of the Institute of Economics of the University Kiel 2010, at the Kiel Young
Researcher Conference at the Kiel Institute for the World Economy 2012, where
the work was rewarded with a best-paper award, at the ‘Nachwuchsworkshop
der Umwelt- und Ressourcenökonomie’ of the ‘Verein für Socialpolitik, Auss-
chuss für Umwelt und Ressourcenökonomie’ 2014 as well as on seminars of the
Institute for Regional Research and of the Group of Environmental, Resource
and Ecological Economics of the University of Kiel.
Besides avoiding climate change and its possible adverse effects, one could en-
able people to better deal with possible adverse effects themselves. The group
most vulnerable to climate change effects are the global poor who have barely
participated in prosperity growth. Education is an important input for sus-
tained economic development (Sen, 1999). Education implies consumption ab-
stinence today, but it enlarges future income possibilities and increases resilience.
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The intertemporal dimension shows that education is closely related to credit
markets, especially for the poor who often finance education with the help of
loans. In poor areas, only informal credit markets with high interest rates exist.
Conventional wisdom suggests that lower interest rates make education more
attractive and thus foster development, but some empirical studies find nega-
tive effects of credit market improvements on education in developing coun-
tries (Islam and Choe, 2013; Maldonado and González-Vega, 2008). This shows
that conventional wisdom may not hold for informal credit markets. It high-
lights the importance of specifying conditions under which credit market im-
provements really lead to more education.
The second paper of my dissertation derives these conditions by taking the pe-
culiarities of informal credit markets into account. Frederik Noack’s and my
fieldwork in fishing villages in India showed that two basic loan categories ex-
ist: a low interest rate loan secured by collateral (‘secured’ loan) and a high
interest rate loan without collateral (‘unsecured’ loan). The collateral takes the
form of a productive investment: fish traders, for example, take fishing boats as
collateral and micro finance institutions normally only allow business loans.
We include a fragmented credit market with two loan types into a two period
model with a skilled and an unskilled sector. As especially many poor commu-
nities rely on harvesting common pool resources for an income, one scenario
also considers how results change if the unskilled sector includes a common
pool resource. Only capital investments needed for production in the unskilled
sector serve as collateral because education cannot be appropriated in case of
default.
It is this collateral arrangement that provokes the adverse effect of a lower inter-
est rate leading to less education. A lowered ‘secured’ interest rate means that
capital for the unskilled sector is available at lower costs. Investment in un-
skilled production increases. Unskilled labor becomes relatively scarce and op-
portunity costs of schooling rise. Education decreases for the relatively poorest
households holding both loan types. For relatively richer households holding
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only a ‘secured’ loan, the higher investment increases the collateral and allows
to transfer a higher share of future income to the present at the low rate. Educa-
tion becomes more attractive. For a large output elasticity of unskilled labor, the
second effect dominates. In this case, the lower ‘secured’ interest rate increases
education.
Lower interest rates improve the situation of the current generation, but, as
the analysis shows, may have a negative effect on future generations through
lower education. Future generations may become locked in the unskilled, low
income sector. To promote development, education should either be supported
directly or, if the support should work via the credit market, special collateral
arrangements should be taken into account.
The paper is joint work with Frederik Noack. We developed the research ques-
tion together, and iterated on the final writing of the paper, while I developed
the modeling framework, did the calculations, and the initial writing with in-
puts from Frederik Noack and Johannes Bröcker. I presented the paper at the
biennial conference of the International Institute of Fisheries Economics and
Trade (IIFET) 2012, the summer school ’Equity and Efficiency in Fisheries’ 2012,
the winter seminar of the German Section of the Regional Science Association
in 2013 and on seminars of the Institute for Regional Research and the Group of
Environmental, Resource and Ecological Economics of the University of Kiel.
In addition to financing investments, credit markets also play an important role
in consumption smoothing and in providing some kind of coverage if access to
formal insurance markets is not available. The higher importance of risk in the
everyday life of the poor (Besley, 1995) increases the relevance of informal cred-
its. On informal credit markets, wholesale traders provide the lion’s share of
loans (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1997). Empirical studies show that they often interlink
the credits with the output market. An ‘interlinked contract’ is a contract that
jointly determines conditions for trade on several markets (Bell, 1988). Stiglitz
(1974c) proposes that these interlinked contracts are a risk sharing mechanism.
Instead of fixing interest rates, the borrower has to sell his output to the trader
INTRODUCTION 6
at below market prices. When income is low (high), interest payments are low
(high). This implies a risk transfer from the borrower to the lender, i.e. an in-
formal insurance. Kamstra and Shiller (2009) propose to issue state debt with
interest payments based on current GDP, which shows that the mechanism to
link interest payments with an insurance component attains attention beyond
development economics.
Still, the set-up of the informal interlinked contracts is problematic because in-
come and interest payments are variable and determined by the same instance,
which may lead to exploitation. Bhaduri (1977) calls the attention to possible
usurious interest rates. Bardhan and Rudra (1978) do not find any evidence
for exploitative behavior of the traders in East Indian Villages, but they do not
compare interest rates from interlinked contracts to other interest rates.
Institutional economics would predict lower interest rates in interlinked con-
tracts due to efficiency gains because the lender saves screening and monitor-
ing costs. Crow and Murshid (1992, 1994) and Bell et al. (1997) in turn provide
evidence that interest rates from interlinked contracts lie above other relevant
rates. How is the puzzle solved? Even though interlinked contracts have a high
importance for the global poor, there is no thorough empirical analysis that in-
cludes risk sharing.
The third paper of the dissertation closes this gap by including a risk mea-
sure into the empirical analysis of interest rates from interlinked contracts. The
dataset used in this paper stems from fieldwork by Frederik Noack and me in
Indian fishing villages in 2010 and 2011 with a household survey in 2011. We
developed the sample design as well as the questionnaire and organized the
data collection and processing.
The estimations in the third paper show that interest rates from interlinked con-
tracts contain an insurance premium: borrowers pay for the risk sharing via a
higher interest rate. Furthermore, calculations show that the average interest
rates from interlinked contracts are of a similar size as interest rates from micro
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finance institutions. The reason for this is that traders are in the special posi-
tion to take the fishing boat as collateral. The interlinkages reduce transaction
costs. The fishing boat as collateral reduces the interest rate and counteracts the
insurance premium. The paper provides empirical evidence that in the case of
missing formal insurance markets interlinked contracts are one way of provid-
ing insurance.
The paper is a single authored paper. I presented it at the ERDE-Workskop
2013 in Kiel, the joint doctoral seminar of the Institute for Regional Research
of the University of Kiel and the Sonderborg University in December 2013 as
well as at the seminar of the Group of Environmental, Resource and Ecological
Economics of the University of Kiel in 2014.
The three papers of my dissertation and their respective research questions
called for three different methodical approaches, namely model calibration with
numerical simulations in the first paper, analytical calculations in the second
paper as well as econometric estimations in the third paper. Still, all papers
think about how to improve the situation of those with no political lobby — the
currently poor as well as future generations —, either through avoiding climate
change or by promoting development.
Furthermore, all papers consider ‘second best’ cases, where transaction costs
call for a deviation from the standard model: political procedures impede im-
mediate emissions tax implementation, information costs on informal markets
call for productive assets as collateral that bias the credit markets against educa-
tion and information costs also make interlinked credit contracts an important
insurance source. All papers show that carefully designed research approaches
have to include market imperfections as real life interactions are full of transac-
tions costs.
Chapter 1
Does the Adverse Announcement
Effect of Climate Policy Matter? A
Dynamic General Equilibrium
Analysis
Abstract: We quantify the welfare effect of a climate policy that is announced
today, but implemented with a known time lag as political procedures impede
immediate implementation. The policy is a carbon emissions tax whose time
path is chosen optimally at the time when implemented. During the time span
before implementation, the announcement induces a lower price of fossil fuel
and thus higher emissions as compared to a no-intervention scenario. In prin-
ciple, this adverse ‘announcement effect’ could more than outweigh in welfare
terms the gain from the tax after implementation. We show this not to be just
a theoretical curiosity. We quantify a ‘window of opportunity’ such that imple-
mentation before (after) its end is a welfare gain (loss) over the no-intervention
scenario. The result is highly sensitive to assumptions on the resource stock
which is afflicted with particular empirical uncertainties. Our central estimate is
a window of opportunity of about 60 years. Hence, there is still time to act, but
the window of opportunity may be smaller. Thus, the adverse announcement
8
DOES THE ADVERSE ANNOUNCEMENT EFFECT OF CLIMATE POLICY MATTER? 9
effect is a worrying phenomenon deserving political awareness. The model is
a Ramsey model extended by an exhaustible carbon resource and linked to a
stylized dynamic climate model adapted from Nordhaus (2008b).
Key Words: Announcement Effect, Dynamic General Equilibrium, Climate Policy, Strong
Green Paradox, Welfare Evaluation
JEL classification: Q 54, Q 32
1.1 Introduction
Policies like the Kyoto-protocol intend to reduce carbon emissions to mitigate
harmful climate change, but bureaucratic and political procedures impede an
immediate policy implementation. The Kyoto Protocol, for example, was agreed
upon in December 1998, became effective in 2005 and was implemented in 2008
(van der Werf and Di Maria, 2011). This implementation lag leads to an ad-
verse ‘announcement effect’. The policy will be anticipated by the owners of
carbonic resources: Knowing that the policy will restrict demand in the future
and thus dampen their price, they are induced to extract more resources before
implementation and sell the extracted resource at a lower price as compared
to a world without any climate policy. The extra emissions during the period
before implementation add to global warming, so that delayed implementation
means a welfare loss compared to an immediate policy implementation.
A priori, it is not clear if an announced policy that is implemented only with a
certain delay is to be preferred over a do-nothing policy. There are two coun-
teracting forces. In the case of an announced policy, emissions are lower than
under a do-nothing policy once the policy is implemented, but they are higher
than under a do-nothing policy before. Obviously, a policy intervention de-
signed optimally at the point in time when it becomes effective will always be
welfare improving if the implementation lag is sufficiently short. If, however,
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the impossibility to implement the policy in a timely manner makes the im-
plementation lag long enough, the second effect could dominate. Then, it turns
out preferable to do nothing rather than announcing and implementing a policy
with too long an implementation lag. This is so because it is the timing rather
than the total amount of emissions that matters for global warming (Nordhaus,
2008b). The atmosphere warms up if the carbon enters the atmosphere at a rate
higher than the rate at which it dissipates into other reservoirs. The announce-
ment effect can make things worse because it pushes emissions up.
Sinn (2009) calls a scenario where the net welfare effect turns out to be the
opposite of what was intended in the first place a ‘green paradox’. Later au-
thors (Gerlagh, 2011) refer to the adverse announcement effect as a ‘weak green
paradox’, while ‘strong green paradox’ means that this adverse effect domi-
nates positive effects, such that the policy is worse than doing nothing. Beyond
lagged implementation, the literature also points to other sources of green para-
doxa, for example ‘leakage effects’ (Smulders et al., 2012) resulting from an in-
complete regional coverage of climate policy (see van der Werf and Di Maria
(2011) for an overview).
This paper aims to analyze the strong green paradox arising from a delayed
climate policy where all agents know when the policy will be implemented. The
adverse announcement effect could, of course, be reduced if the time path of
the announced intervention is chosen optimally from the present point of view,
taking the anticipation by the market participants into consideration. Such a
policy would, however, be time inconsistent and thus not credible because it
would be welfare enhancing at the time of policy implementation to introduce
the tax that is optimal from then on. We therefore consider the announcement
of a policy that is optimally designed as to the point in time when implemented.
Our main result is the estimation of a ‘window of opportunity’ for a favorable
climate policy. It is defined such that an intervention implemented before its
end is welfare increasing but welfare reducing afterwards. It turns out that,
for all scenarios studied, there exists such a window of finite length. Hence,
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the strong green paradox is shown to hold if the policy is announced to be
implemented after the window is closed.
We set up, calibrate and solve a dynamic general equilibrium model with per-
fect foresight, linking an economic Dasgupta-Heal-Solow-Stiglitz exhaustible
resource model (Dasgupta and Heal, 1974; Solow, 1974; Stiglitz, 1974a,b) with a
dynamic climate module adapted from Nordhaus (2008b) and Nordhaus (2010b).
Carbon extracted from an exhaustible resource is a production input and pollu-
tant added to the stock of greenhouse gas in the atmosphere, staying there for
long and causing the mean earth temperature to increase gradually. A higher
temperature reduces output as described by a damage function also adapted
from Nordhaus (2008b, 2010b). The climate model describes how the atmo-
spheric carbon slowly dissipates into other reservoirs. Climate policy is intro-
duced by a tax on carbon use, which is equivalent to a tax on carbon emissions
because input and emissions are related one to one. As the tax is chosen op-
timally at the point of implementation, immediate implementation of the tax
leads to the global welfare maximum, while an implementation lag only allows
for a non-optimal solution, possibly one that is worse than doing nothing. Wel-
fare is measured by the intertemporal relative equivalent variation, a monotone
transform of the utility of the perpetually living representative household. The
model is written in continuous time.
Deviating from common practice in integrated climate assessment modeling,
we do not run an optimization machinery but solve the dynamic market equi-
librium conditions because the inefficient time paths with lagged or no policy
intervention do not have an equivalent optimization representation. This is
straight forward and thus, in our view, more transparent than finding ineffi-
cient market solutions by iterative applications of an optimization procedure as
in Nordhaus (2008b).
The paper contributes to two strands of literature. The first strand analyzes the
announcement effect. Di Maria et al. (2012) analyze the announcement effect
in a model with two resource types that differ in their carbon content. They
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compare emissions until an announced emissions cap is implemented to the
laissez-faire development and find a weak green paradox. Smulders et al. (2012)
develop a model with capital accumulation, and clean as well as dirty energy
inputs. They show that a weak green paradox even occurs if resources are not
scarce or the implementation date is uncertain. Eichner and Pethig (2011) ana-
lyze conditions for a green paradox in a two period three country model. The
second strand of literature uses integrated assessment models to analyze pol-
icy scenarios in a second best world. Blanford et al. (2009) and Bosetti et al.
(2009) consider the anticipated participation of developing countries to the cli-
mate coalition. Bosetti et al. (2009) explicitly consider leakage effects, but nei-
ther Blanford et al. (2009) nor Bosetti et al. (2009) discuss the response of the
resource owners to announced participation. The contribution of this paper lies
in the quantification of the ‘strong green paradox’. Further, to our knowledge,
we are the first to solve the market equilibrium conditions in an integrated as-
sessment model to analyze climate policies in a second best world.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we intro-
duce the model and solve for the market equilibrium as well as for the social
planner’s solution. We also calculate the optimal tax path and introduce the
welfare measure. The solution approach and the calibration follow in section
1.3. In section 1.4, we discuss the results. The paper closes with a conclusion.
1.2 The Model
The model connects a climate module and an economic module. The economic
module describes consumption, production, capital accumulation and resource
extraction based on assumptions on technologies and preferences, while the
climate module translates emissions into temperature change. Temperature, in
turn, affects output. As usual, dotted variables like X˙ denote time derivatives.
Hats denote growth rates, Xˆ := X˙/X = d log X/dt. Throughout the paper,
Latin letters denote variables that depend on time. Exemptions are stated.
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The climate module is borrowed from the DICE-model by Nordhaus (2008b)1.
It consists of two connected sub-systems: the first sub-system describes the
carbon-cycle, i.e. the evolvement of the carbon masses between the three car-
bon reservoirs atmosphere, upper ocean and lower ocean over time, while the
second sub-system describes the impact of the carbon concentration in the at-
mosphere on the temperature (see figure 1.1).
The flows between the atmosphere and the upper ocean as well as the carbon
emissions R from carbon burned in the production process and emissions from
land use change E determine the mass of carbon in the atmosphere M1. Emis-
sions from land use change are exogenous and decline over time at a constant
rate. The carbon-transition matrix Γ consists of constant parameters and de-
scribes the flows between the three reservoirs M1, M2 and M3 by specifying
the inflows and outflows of each reservoir. The columns of Γ sum up to zero
reflecting the mass balance requirement. The masses in the three reservoirs add
up to a constant once there are no more external carbon inflows. Over the long
run, most of the carbon diffuses into the upper and then into the deeper oceans.
The sub-system reads
M˙ = ΓM + [R + E, 0, 0]> (1.1)
with M := [M1, M2, M3]>. Row vectors are written as [. . .], > indicates a trans-
pose. Carbon compounds are measured in terms of their respective carbon con-
tent (stocks in giga tons of carbon GtC, flows in giga tons carbon per annum
GtC/a)2.
The carbon concentration in the atmosphere as well as non-CO2 greenhouse
gases influence the radiative forcing, which in turn controls the increase of the
global mean surface temperature per unit of time. The function Π(M1, t) de-
scribes this mechanism. It is increasing in M1 and, for the first 100 years, it
is also increasing in t. The latter reflects the exogenous influence of non-CO2
greenhouse gases. The global mean surface temperature T1 dynamically inter-
acts with the temperature of the lower oceans T2, as described by the matrix Λ.
1We adapted his discrete time version to continuous time.
2Table A.1 in the appendix list the units. Units are printed in teletype font.
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This leads to the temperature dynamics
T˙ = ΛT + [Π(M1, t), 0]> (1.2)
with T := [T1, T2]>. Temperatures are measured as differences from their pre-
industrial (in 1900) level in ◦C.
FIGURE 1.1: Interactions in the Climate Module.
The economic part of the model is a Ramsey-type growth model with exoge-
nous technological change, where firms and households interact on competitive
markets. Households consume, supply labor and own the assets of the econ-
omy consisting of the capital stock and the market value of the resource stock.
Even though there is just a single representative household, the decentralized
market equilibrium does not have an equivalent optimization representation
due to the climate externality. This is a second best setting. We therefore first
derive the equilibrium conditions for the decentralized economy with an ex-
ogenous tax imposed on carbon use. We then derive the tax rate leading to the
welfare optimum.
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Firms produce the final output Y with labor, capital K and the carbon flow R as
inputs according to a Cobb-Douglas technology
Y = Ω(T1)KαRβeλt (1.3)
with partial production elasticities α > 0 and β > 0, α+ β < 1. The parameter
λ is the rate of technical progress. Labor is constant and therefore not displayed
explicitly. Its partial production elasticity is 1 − α − β. Constant labor is in
contrast to Nordhaus (2008b) who includes exogenous population growth. The
carbon flow R represents a mixture of fossil fuels extracted from an exhaustible
carbon resource stock S. As a common denominator, the fossil fuel inputs are
measured in terms of their respective carbon content which is one-to-one emit-
ted into the atmosphere after being burned in production. Hence, R stands for
both, input and emissions, measured in GtC/a. The carbon resource stock —
carbon stock in the following — also represents a mixture of fossil fuels con-
verted into carbon, measured in GtC.
Output is scaled by the function Ω(T1) which is decreasing in the global mean
surface temperature T1. It represents economic damages due to higher tem-
peratures. The specification, taken from Nordhaus and co-authors (Nordhaus
and Boyer, 2000; Nordhaus, 2008b), assumes the percentage loss of GDP to
be a quadratic function of T1. Losses reflect estimates of sea-level rise costs,
adverse impacts on health, non-market damages, the potential costs of catas-
trophic damages and negative impacts on major sectors such as agriculture due
to global warming.
Due to perfect competition, input prices equal their respective marginal pro-
ductivities. Taking the output good as numéraire, we obtain
ι+ δ = αY/K, (1.4)
q + r = βY/R (1.5)
with carbon price q, interest rate ι, depreciation rate δ and specific tax rate r.
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Imposing the tax either on the resource input or on the emissions is equivalent
because the carbon extracted as a component of fossil fuel is one-to-one emitted
as a component of CO2.
The input flow R is extracted from a continuous set of privately owned carbon
sources exploitable at costs per unit of flow that vary across sources. In their role
as resource owners, households are price takers selling the flow on a competi-
tive market. It is well known that under these conditions, sources are exploited
in the order of ascending unit costs such that unit costs can be expressed as a
non-increasing function k(S) of the total carbon stock S in all yet unexploited
sources, provided the interest rate is positive (see e.g. Herfindahl (1967); Solow
and Wan (1976); Laitner (1984)).
Furthermore, resource owners collectively act like a representative owner of
all sources who chooses, at any time t, an extraction path R(τ), τ ≥ t, as to
maximize the present (as of time t) value of future net revenues from selling the
flows at prices taken as given. The asset value of the remaining stock S(t) at
time t is thus
v(t, S(t)) =
1
D(t)
max
R(τ),τ≥t
∫ ∞
t
D(τ)R(τ)
(
q(τ)− k(S(τ))
)
dτ (1.6)
subject to
S˙ = −R. (1.7)
The discount factor D has the law of motion
D˙ = −ιD, (1.8)
with boundary condition D(0) = 1.
From the current value Hamiltonian
H = R
(
q− k(S)
)
− pR
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with co-state p of S, we obtain the optimum conditions
q = k(S) + p (1.9)
and
p˙ = ιp + Rk′(S), (1.10)
the augmented Hotelling rule. The transversality condition is
lim
t→∞ D(t)p(t)S(t) = 0. (1.11)
The consumption side of the model is standard. An immortal representative
household owns all assets a of the economy, supplies inelastically a constant
stock of labor and receives the tax revenue collected by the state as a lump sum.
The state has no role to play other than collecting the tax and channeling it to
the household’s budget. The asset value is the value of the capital stock plus
the value of the resource stock,
a = K + v. (1.12)
As output is transformed one-to-one into investment, capital is measured in
units of the numéraire. The household chooses consumption C to maximize
utility
U =
∫ ∞
0
u(C)e−ρτdτ
subject to the budget constraint, with subjective discount rate ρ. As usual, u has
the constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution form,
u =
C1−θ
1− θ ,
with intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1/θ. The flow budget constraint is
a˙ = ιa + (1− α− β)Y + rR− C (1.13)
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stating that saving a˙ equals income minus consumption. Income has three com-
ponents, interest on the asset, labor income and tax income collected by the state
and paid to the household. The market prevents chain-letter credit financing
such that, for t→ ∞, the present value of the asset must be nonnegative (Barro
and Sala-i Martin, 2004, p. 92),
lim
t→∞ D(t)a(t) ≥ 0.
The optimality conditions are the Keynes-Ramsey rule Cˆ = (ι− ρ)/θ and the
transversality condition
lim
t→∞ D(t)a(t) = 0. (1.14)
Integrating the Keynes-Ramsey rule, we can write optimal consumption in lev-
els as
C = (eρtBD)−1/θ (1.15)
with an endogenous constant B. Note that, unlike the other variables in Latin
letters, this one does not depend on time.
It is convenient to write the budget constraint (1.13) in a different equivalent
way by inserting (1.4), (1.5) and (1.12),
K˙ + v˙ = ι(K + v) +Y− (ι+ δ)K− qR− C. (1.16)
Taking the time derivative of (1.6), using (1.8), yields
v˙ = ιv− R(q− k(S)). (1.17)
Substituting this for v˙ in (1.16), one obtains the production balance of the econ-
omy,
K˙ = Y− δK− Rk(S)− C. (1.18)
As both components of D(t)a(t) = D(t)K(t) + D(t)v(t) are non-negative, for
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TABLE 1.1: Overview Equilibrium Conditions Market Setting
M˙ = ΓM + [E + R, 0, 0]> (1.1) M(0) = M¯
T˙ = ΛT + [Π(M1, t), 0]> (1.2) T(0) = T¯
Y = Ω(T1)KαRβeλt (1.3)
C =
(
BDeρt
)−1/θ (1.15) limt→∞ D(t)K(t) = 0 (1.19)
D˙ = −ιD (1.8) D(0) = 1
ι = αY/K− δ (1.4)
R = βY/(k(S) + p + r) (1.5)
p˙ = ιp + Rk′(S) (1.10) limt→∞ D(t)p(t)S(t) = 0 (1.11)
S˙ = −R (1.7) S(0) = S¯
K˙ = Y− δK− C− Rk(S) (1.18) K(0) = K¯
(1.14) to hold, both components have to approach zero as t→ ∞. The transver-
sality condition (1.14) thus implies
lim
t→∞ D(t)K(t) = 0. (1.19)
This completes the model description. The equations are summarized in Table
1.1, with algebraic and differential equations in the left and boundary condi-
tions in the right column. M¯ and so forth denote initial stocks. The model has
thirteen unknown functions of time if we plug in (1.9) for the carbon price q,
namely three carbon masses stacked in the vector M, two temperatures stacked
in the vector T, output Y, consumption C, carbon flow R, carbon stock S, the
marginal asset value per unit of stock p, capital K, interest rate ι as well as the
discount factor D. The model also contains the integration constant B. There are
eight differential equations with initial boundary conditions corresponding to
the variables M, T, D, S and K. Furthermore, there are four algebraic equations
for the variables Y, C, ι and R. There is an additional differential equation for
p. Finally, there are two terminal boundary condition allowing for determin-
ing p as well as B, provided the differential equation system has two unstable
eigenvalues. This turns out to be the case.
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So far, the tax rate is taken as an exogenous policy instrument. To derive an
optimal path of the tax rate, we solve the planner’s problem to choose, starting
at t = 0, a time path of consumption C and resource extraction R to maximize
the representative household’s utility
U =
∫ ∞
0
u(C)e−ρτdτ
subject to technological, resource and climate constraints
K˙ = Ω(T1)KαRβeλt − δK− C− Rk(S),
S˙ = −R,
M˙ = ΓM + [E + R, 0, 0]>,
T˙ = ΛT + [Π(M1, t), 0]>,
(1.20)
given inherited state variables K, S, M and T at t = 0.
The present value Hamiltonian is
H =u(C)e−ρt +
(
Ω(T1)KαRβeλt − δK− C− Rk(S)
)
PK
− RPS +
(
M>Γ> + [E + R, 0, 0]
)
PM +
(
T>Λ> + [Π(M1, t), 0]
)
PT. (1.21)
PK and so forth are the costates associated with states K and so forth. PM and PT
are column vectors. If HR and so forth denote derivatives of the Hamiltonian
with respect to R and so forth, the static and dynamic efficiency conditions read,
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respectively,
HR = 0 ⇒ 0 = PK βYR − PS + PM1 − PKk(S), (1.22)
HC = 0 ⇒ PK = C−θe−ρt, (1.23)
HK = −P˙K ⇒ −P˙K = PK
(
αY
K
− δ
)
, (1.24)
HS = −P˙S ⇒ −P˙S = −PKk′(S)R, (1.25)
HM = − ˙PM ⇒ − ˙PM = Γ>PM +
[
PT1
∂Π
∂M1
, 0, 0
]>
, (1.26)
HT = −P˙T ⇒ −P˙T = Λ>PT +
[
PK
∂Y
∂T1
, 0
]>
. (1.27)
The transversality condition is
limt→∞Z(t)>P(t) = 0 (1.28)
with Z(t) and P(t) denoting column vectors of states and costates in corre-
sponding order.
The decentralized market is brought to fulfill the optimality conditions if the
tax rate is
r = −PM1/PK. (1.29)
To see this, insert BD for PK and Dˆ for PˆK, −r for PM1/PK and PK p for PS. Then,
(1.24) becomes (1.8) with ι from (1.4), (1.23) becomes (1.15) and (1.22) becomes
(1.5) with q = PS/PK + k(S)PK. Inserting p = PS/PK into (1.10) leads to (1.25).
Equations (1.19) and (1.11) are the transversality conditions in (1.28) for K and
S, respectively. The tax rule (1.29) has an obvious interpretation: −PM1 is the
marginal utility loss from an extra unit of carbon in the atmosphere. It is trans-
lated into units of the numéraire by dividing through PK, the marginal utility of
an extra unit of the numéraire.
For welfare evaluation of policies, we use two measures, a relative and an abso-
lute intertemporal equivalent variation. The former is the constant percentage h
by which consumption Cˇ of the benchmark scenario must be changed to attain
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the utility level U of the policy scenario. A relative intertemporal equivalent
variation h > 0 (h < 0) indicates a welfare gain (loss) as compared to the bench-
mark. The relative intertemporal equivalent variation is thus implicitly defined
by
U =
∫ ∞
0
(
(1+ h)Cˇ
)1−θ
1− θ e
−ρτdτ.
Using the definition of Uˇ,
Uˇ =
∫ ∞
0
Cˇ1−θ
1− θ e
−ρτdτ,
one obtains
h =
((
U
Uˇ
)1/(1−θ)
− 1
)
.
The absolute intertemporal equivalent variation is the amount of the numéraire
W one would have to give to the household in t = 0 to make it as well off as in
the policy case,
W = h
∫ ∞
0
Dˇ(τ)Cˇ(τ)dτ. (1.30)
The utility level U can comfortably be calculated by adding an extra differential
equation with an appropriate boundary condition to the system. Define
V(t) :=
∫ ∞
t
u(C)e−ρτdτ
such that U = V(0). Taking the time differential delivers the extra differential
equation
V˙ = −u(C)e−ρt.
The transversality condition
limt→∞V(z) = 0 (1.31)
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is obtained from
U = limt→∞
(∫ t
0
u(C)e−ρτdτ +V(t)
)
= U + limt→∞V(t).
Thus, one can treat V as a forward looking variable that can be determined like
the other variables in the system.
1.3 Solution Approach and Calibration
Three important issues arise when operationalizing the model. First, the sys-
tem cannot be solved until infinity. Second, as the model includes externalities,
the market solution does not have an equivalent optimization representation.
Third, some data for calibration is afflicted with particular uncertainties.
As the system cannot be solved until infinity, operational boundary conditions
holding at a finite horizon need to replace the transversality conditions. This
procedure can be justified since, by discounting, the present value welfare with
finite and infinite horizon become arbitrarily close to each other. To obtain vi-
able final boundary conditions, we assume constant steady state growth rates.
The following two assumptions lead to constant steady state growth rates: First,
as emissions asymptotically tend towards zero, we consider the steady state
system that would prevail if no more emissions entered the climate module.
Second, we assume that the extraction cost component in the production bal-
ance (1.18) in the long run grows slower than the capital stock, i.e.
Rˆ + ek:SSˆ < Kˆ (1.32)
with the partial elasticity of extraction costs with respect to the carbon stock ek:S.
As boundary conditions, we then require a subset of the variables to already
reach constant growth rates at a final point in time. This is similar to requiring
some variables to reach their steady state values at a finite horizon, a method
known from literature (see Bröcker and Korzhenevych (2013) for a discussion).
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As there is some arbitrariness in fixing the finite horizon, we vary the horizon to
ensure that the choice of the finite horizon does not drive results. Furthermore,
we also run a model version using the stable manifold approach proposed by
Bröcker and Korzhenevych (2013). Results do not change.
To obtain the model solution, we do not run an optimization machinery. We
directly solve the dynamic market equilibrium conditions with r = 0 for the
market outcome and r = −PM/PK for the planner’s solution. The variables are
solved in log-deviations from their respective values in 2005, if data is available,
or from a proxy steady state if data for 2005 is not available. The latter is the
case for the shadow values. The proxy steady state is defined as the steady state
but with climate as in t = 0. Two variables are not solved in log-deviations: V is
used directly, while T is solved in absolute deviations from the respective 2005
data.
The reference year for model calibration and the starting point of the model
(t = 0) is 2005. The calibration of the climate module is based on the 2010-
Version of the RICE/DICE model (Nordhaus, 2010b) including initial values
for carbon masses M(0) and temperatures T(0). The appendix A.2 gives details.
Calibration of consumption and of production including the initial capital stock
as well as calibration of the resource sector relies on several data sources. It is
explained in the following. Again, the appendix A.2 gives details.
For the consumption side of the model, we take the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution 1/θ = 2/3 from literature. The time preference parameter is ρ =
0.015 1/a, also from literature. This yields a real interest rate in steady state of
ι∗ = 4.2% 1/a.
To calibrate the production side, we take the capital’s cost share α = 0.33 from
literature (Barro and Sala-i Martin, 2004, page 58) and calculate carbon’s cost
share β = 0.058 from IEA (2007) and EIA (2010). The scaler of the production
function at t = 0, Ω(T¯1), ensures Y(0) = 45.23 trillion $. The rate of technical
progress λ = 0.0134 1/a is chosen to match a steady state growth rate of g = 1.8
% 1/a.
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Regarding the initial capital stock K(0), there is no reliable data available. How-
ever, one can use the fact that the capital-output ratio is constant in steady state
implying that capital and output grow at the same rate. Compared to the cli-
mate variables, this constant capital-output ratio is reached relatively fast. An
initially smaller or bigger ratio approaches the steady state value in a couple of
years. Thus, instead of assigning a value to K(0), we require the growth rates
of capital and output to be equal in t = 0.
To calibrate the resource sector, we first specify extraction costs as
k(S) = γS−e (1.33)
similar to Laitner (1984). For condition (1.32) to hold in steady state,
e <
ι∗
ι∗ − g (1.34)
is required with the steady state interest rate ι∗ and the steady state growth
rate of the economy g. To see why, use the fact that the assumption of constant
steady state growth rates leads to Yˆ∗ = Kˆ∗ = Cˆ∗ = g and Sˆ∗ = Rˆ∗ = g− ι∗.
Furthermore, the partial elasticity of extraction costs with respect to the carbon
stock ek:S = −e. Condition (1.32) thus reads (1− e)(g− ι∗) < g, which one can
rearrange to (1.34). Extraction costs are zero for γ = 0 and constant for e = 0.
For e = 1, unit extraction costs double if the stock is halved. This shows the
close connection between e and the carbon stock.
For the initial carbon stock S(0) — the sum of oil, gas and coal stocks converted
into carbon —, several definitions and accordingly, different values are avail-
able with the smallest and the largest differing by a factor of 10. Larger carbon
stocks imply the use of reservoires that are more difficult to exploit such that
cost developments should also differ. To reflect this, we define three scenarios
with different initial carbon stocks and different e:
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• In one scenario, the initial carbon stock matches data on carbon reserves3,
S(0) = 612 CtC. We assume constant extraction cost, e = 0, to take into ac-
count that reserves are recoverable with current technologies (‘CEC’ sce-
nario).
• In the second scenario, the initial carbon stock matches the carbon re-
source base (the sum of reserves and resources (UNDP, 2000, p.481)) in-
stead. The estimated resource base amounts to roughly 3563 GtC4 and
is 5-6 times larger than the reserves. The larger resource amount is only
recoverable with rising extraction costs. We thus define a scenario with
increasing extraction cost, e = 1, and an initial carbon stock of S(0) =
3000 GtC (‘IEC’ scenario).
• Since estimates of shale oil and shale gas are still not very good (World
Energy Council, 2010), we include a third scenario with an even larger
initial carbon stock of S(0) = 6000 GtC. This is similar to the DICE model
that puts an uppor bound of 6000 GtC on emissions. We use e = 1.6, a
rough estimate based on the long-term oil-supply cost curve given in IEA
(2008). A parameter value e = 1.6 implies that extraction costs increase
with the factor 3 if the resource stock is halved. This implies a sharper
increase in extraction costs with declining carbon stock as compared to the
IEC scenario such that the third scenario has sharply increasing extraction
costs (‘SIEC scenario’).
To ensure compliance with constant steady state growth rates, we have to check
if condition (1.34) holds. Plugging in data leads to e < 1.75. This is fulfilled in
all scenarios.
3UNDP (2000, p. 481) define „Reserves“ and „Resources“ as follows: „Reserves: those occur-
rences of energy sources or mineral that are identified and measured as economically and tech-
nically recoverable with current technologies and prices“and „Resources: those occurrences of
energy sources or minerals with less certain geological and/or economic/technical recoverabil-
ity characteristics, but that are considered to become potentially recoverable with foreseeable
technological and economic development“.
4based on 5090 Gtoe from UNDP (2000, p. 116)
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Furthermore, we have to calibrate γ. It is chosen to ensure an initial carbon
flow of R(0) = 7.76 GtC, which results in an initial carbon price of q(0) = 0.34
$/kgC.5 Note that the carbon price has a cost component, k(S) = γS−e, and
a rent component, p. The rent component is endogenous and driven by the
abundance of the resource. It is lower in the more resource abundant scenarios.
Thus, γ differs across scenarios: it scales initial extraction costs to be higher in
the more resource abundant scenarios to ensure the same initial resource price.
In the CEC-scenario, initial resource extraction costs turn out to be 0.23 $/kgC,
while they are slightly higher in the IEC-scenario with 0.30 $/kgC and even
higher in the SIEC-scenario with 0.31 $/kgC.
Given q(0), we can calculate rent to price ratios — the rent share in the price
— to compare the different model results with available data. The rent to price
ratios of the CEC–, the IEC– and the SIEC–scenario are 33%, 11% and 9% for
2005, respectively. Bauer et al. (2013) present data for 2010 with rents close to
zero for natural gas and coal in Russia, but rent to price ratios around 50% for
crude oil in the Middle East and North Africa, natural gas in EU27 and coal
in China as well as around 30% for crude oil in the USA. The average rent to
price ratio for some European countries (namely the Netherlands, Denmark,
United Kingdom and Norway) in 1999 for oil and gas was 34% (calculation
based on European Commission (2002)). If coal were included, the rent to price
ratio would probably decrease. This is the case because coal with a reserve
to production ratio6 of 224 a is relatively more abundant than oil and natural
gas with reserve to production ratios of 40 and 62 a, respectively (Feygin and
Satkin, 2004).7 The comparison suggests that currently observed scarcity rents
are more in line with the CEC scenario.
To match reported data on rent to price ratios in the scenarios with a more abun-
dant initial resource stock, the rent to price ratios in these scenarios would need
5Note that $/kgC = 1012$/GtC.
6The reserve to production ratio gives the period the resource stock lasts at the current ex-
traction rate.
7The reserve to production ratios in the CEC, the IEC and the SIEC scenario are 79, 387 and
773 a, respectively.
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to be higher. To achieve this, one would have to assume a lower carbon flow
price q(0). As a consequence, the carbon flow R(0) would be higher. Both
would be a contradiction to reported data.
1.4 Results
1.4.1 First-best Policy
Before coming to our main point of estimating a window of opportunity, we
look at the welfare gain of an instantaneously implemented optimal policy over
laissez-faire. For the CEC scenario, one gains a relative intertemporal equiv-
alent variation of h = 0.0054% corresponding to an absolute intertemporal
equivalen variation of W = 71.6 billion $, a share of 0.16 % of 2005 GDP, a
tiny number indeed. The gain in the IEC scenario is larger, but still small. The
relative intertemporal equivalent variation is h = 0.0361% corresponding to
an absolute intertemporal equivalen varation of W = 452.3 billion $, a share
of 1.00 % of 2005 GDP. In the SIEC scenario, h = 0.0559% corresponding to
W = 694.2 billion $, a share of 1.54 % of 2005 GDP. This is still small, but
larger by a factor of 10 as compared to the CEC scenario.
As the three scenarios are identical otherwise, differences in resource scarcity
explain the range of welfare results. If carbon is scarce, markets tend to econo-
mize its use which turns out to be good for climate. All calculated global mean
surface temperatures for the year 2100 are in the range of the IPCC predictions,
but temperatures are lower in the scenarios with a scarcer resource (see Table
1.2). Thus, resource scarcity means less room for favorable climate policy. This
result is in line with Golosov et al. (2014) who compare the effect of an optimal
tax on scarce oil and abundant coal relative to the laissez-faire allocation. They
find that the effect of the tax is large on coal use, but small on oil use.
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TABLE 1.2: Comparison of the Predicted Global Mean Temperature Increases
for the Year 2100
.
Scenario ∆◦C from 1900
CEC 2.1
IEC 3.1
SIEC 3.3
IPCC - B1* 2.4
IPCC - A1B* 3.4
IPCC - A2* 4.2
RICE-2010** 3.6
DICE-2007*** 3.1
*based on IPCC (2007): A1B assumes a converging world with very rapid economic growth
and balanced technological change; B1 also assumes a converging world, but a rapid change
towards a service and information technology; A2 considers a fragmented world with
increasing population and slower technological change, **based on Nordhaus (2010a), ***
based on Nordhaus (2008b).
As we base our modeling of the economy-ecology interaction on the DICE
model, we compare our welfare outcomes to the DICE-2007 results. In the
DICE-2007, the net economic welfare gain from optimal policy is 3,400 billion
$, about 0.17% of the discounted value of total future income (Nordhaus, 2008b).
The relative equivalent variation of optimal policy as compared to laissez-faire
is h = 0.2% 8, i.e. the net economic welfare gain from optimal policy is 0.2% of
the discounted value of total future consumption. The share is slightly larger
than 0.17% as it relates to consumption and not to income. The relative equiv-
alent variation of optimal policy as compared to laissez-faire in the DICE-2007
is four times the value in our SIEC scenario and 40 times the value in our CEC
scenario.
8We calculate h according to the formulas reported in this paper using the discount factors
as well as consumption values reported in the DICE-2007.
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The main explanation why our welfare results differ a lot from those of the
DICE model are again differences in resource scarcity. We deviate from the
DICE model as we need an explicitly modeled resource sector for the evalua-
tion of the strong green paradox. The DICE model does not model resource
extraction but places an upper limit on carbon emissions. The carbon limit in
the DICE-2007 is the same as in our SIEC scenario, but the resource in the SIEC
scenario is nevertheless scarce because extraction costs go up rapidly with on-
going exploitation.9
Furthermore, different from the DICE model, we do neither allow for abate-
ment nor include a backstop technology. In the DICE model, both options give
climate policy more influence because, in addition to influencing the timing
of emissions, climate policy can also influence the total amount emitted. This
gives more room for welfare enhancing climate policy in the DICE model as
compared to our model.
In contrast to the discussed fundamental theoretical differences between our
model and the DICE model that lead to a larger welfare gain of optimal policy
in the DICE model as compared to our model, differences in calibration operate
the other way. Calibration between the DICE-2007 and our model differ because
we mainly base calibration on the 2010 update, as e.g. the RICE-2010 model —
the regionalized version of the DICE model (Nordhaus, 2010b).10 The predic-
tion for the laissez-faire temperature in the year 2100 is higher in the RICE-2010
than in the DICE-2007 (see Table 1.2). A higher laissez-faire temperature gives
more room for favorable climate policy. Everything else equal, the reported cali-
bration differences should lead to higher future laissez-faire temperatures and a
corresponding higher welfare effect of climate policy in our model as compared
9The predicted temperatures cannot be directly compared as differences stem to a large ex-
tent from differences in the calibration of the climate module, see the following discussion.
10There is an unchecked Excel version of the 2010 DICE model, but the solver is unreliable
(Nordhaus and Sztorc, 2013, p. 49). There is a 2013 DICE version, but with a different definition
of the baseline scenario. The baseline case now refers to a scenario that extents current policies
(as of 2010) until infinity (Nordhaus and Sztorc, 2013, p. 24) instead of considering the laissez-
faire outcome.
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to the DICE-2007. Still, we expect this calibration effect to be small compared to
the theoretical differences.
An obvious question is why we do not, though following Nordhaus in many
other aspects, also buy his carbon abundance assumption. The answer is: it
is far out because our model would conclude, and in our opinion rightly so,
that the carbon use (and thus the carbon emissions) should be much larger in a
laissez-faire market equilibrium without extraction costs than it actually is. The
DICE model is not forced to come to this conclusion because, strangely enough,
the marginal product of carbon use exceeding a certain level is zero.
Simulations with a reduced carbon limit in the DICE-2007 GAMS version (see
Nordhaus (2008a)) support our argument that resource scarcity explains the
differences in the welfare effects of optimal climate policy. With a carbon limit
of 600 GtC as in our CEC scenario, the relative equivalent variation in the DICE-
2007 reduces to h = 0.0047%, similar to our CEC result ( h = 0.0054%). It is
slightly lower than our CEC result due to the already mentioned differences in
calibration.
The discussion suggests that resource scarcity is the main driver of the differ-
ent welfare results of optimal climate policy between the DICE model and our
model. The analysis indicates that resource scarcity and global warming should
be considered in a joint framework as data indicates that resource rents are sub-
stantial, which implies that resources are scarce. Resource scarcity, in turn, re-
duces the positive welfare effect of optimal climate policy as markets economize
on the resource.
1.4.2 Estimating a Window of Opportunity
To evaluate the strong green paradox, we calculate the welfare differences be-
tween scenarios with an announced policy and a do-nothing policy. The sce-
nario with an announced policy is a scenario where, in t > 0, the tax is intro-
duced that is optimal from then on. In t = 0, agents correctly anticipate the
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introduction of the tax in t > 0. As mentioned before, the time path of the
announced intervention starting in t > 0 cannot be chosen optimally from the
present point of view, taking the anticipation by the market participants into
consideration, because such a policy would be time inconsistent and thus not
credible. Such a policy would be time inconsistent, because it would be welfare
enhancing at the time of policy implementation to introduce the then optimal
tax and not the initially announced tax.
We say that an announcement effect exists whenever an announced policy causes
a behavior change prior to implementing the respective policy as compared to
the do-nothing scenario (weak green paradox). Figure 1.2 illustrates the an-
nouncement effect for an implementation lag of 60 years. It shows the percent
excess carbon emissions in the scenario with an implementation lag of 60 years
compared to a do-nothing policy over time: the positive numbers indicate that
emissions in the case with announced policy are initially higher than emissions
in the case without policy. The difference increases over time as the extracted
resource that causes emissions and capital are not perfect substitutes but ex-
hibit a certain complementarity. After the policy is implemented, emissions are
lower compared to the market outcome.
In spite of a negative announcement effect, a lagged implemented optimal pol-
icy can still be desirable if the overall welfare effect of the policy is positive. In
other words, the occurrence of a weak green paradox does not imply a strong
green paradox. If the length of the announcement period is zero, the optimal tax
can be implemented immediately (first-best solution). Starting with a length of
zero, we increase the length of the announcement period to see if welfare results
change.
We find that the overall welfare effect depends on the length of the announce-
ment period: it is positive for small periods, negative for intermediate periods
and approaches zero in the very long run. A ‘window of opportunity’ for favor-
able climate policy arises. It is defined such that an intervention implemented
before its end is welfare increasing, but welfare reducing afterwards. The strong
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FIGURE 1.2: Emissions: Laissez-faire vs. Announcement Period of 60 Years.
green paradox arises for policies announced to be implemented after the win-
dow of opportunity closes. The window of opportunity in the CEC scenario
is 12 years, while it is 66 years in the IEC scenario and 96 years in the SIEC
scenario. Figure 1.3 illustrates the window of opportunity for the IEC scenario
by showing the welfare gain of the (delayed) intervention as compared to no
intervention over the length of the implementation lag. A positive number in-
dicates a welfare gain, a negative number indicates a welfare loss implying that
a strong green paradox arises. For an announcement period of zero, the figure
displays the welfare gain of optimal policy.
Major uncertainties concern the scarcity of the carbon stock, namely its size
and the extraction cost curve. Figure 1.4 shows the length of the window of
opportunity for e = 1 and e = 1.6 over different initial resource stocks. It
shows that the initial stock has a great influence on the window of opportunity,
while the influence of e, i.e. of the shape of the extraction cost curve, is small.
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FIGURE 1.3: Window of Opportunity in the IEC Scenario: The Welfare Effect of
Lagged Policy Implementation depending on the Length of the Announcement
Period.
Other major uncertainties concern discounting and the damage function —
2.4% output loss if the surface temperature increases by 2◦Celsius from now
seems tiny. Simulations show that a larger output loss means a larger welfare
effect, but it has little effect on the window of opportunity. Halfing the time
preference rate roughly doubles the welfare effect, but only slightly reduces the
window of opportunity.
Furthermore, we do not allow for a ‘backstop’ technology that would make
it possible to switch to a carbon-free production if the carbon price becomes
too high. We also disregard Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) which would
cut through the one-to-one relation between carbon input and emissions. Both
options would offer more room for favorable climate policy as they allow not
only to influence the timing of but also the total amount of emissions.
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ing on the Length of the Announcement Period for different initial Resource
Stocks.
1.5 Conclusion
This paper is on the evaluation of the overall welfare effect of announced cli-
mate policy. The Kyoto Protocol is a prominent example for announced climate
policy: between the agreement on the policy in 1998 and its implementation in
2008 was an announcement period of 10 years.11 If climate policy cannot be im-
plemented immediately due to political and bureaucratic procedures, resource
owners anticipate the future emissions restrictions and increase extraction in
the meantime. This negative effect is well established in the literature. Still,
should the policy be implemented or not? It is a priori not clear if the reduction
in emissions occurring with policy implementation can more than compensate
increased emissions during the announcement period or not.
11On may argue that the Kyoto protocol was not the implementation of the policy that was
optimal from 2008 on as proposed in our analysis. Still, the Kyoto protocol gives an example
for the existence of an announcement period.
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Our analysis confirms that an announcement effect — a behavior change prior
to the implementation of the policy — exists and that its effect is quantitatively
relevant for the overall welfare effect in state-of the art models. Laissez-faire is
better than intervention if the implementation lag is longer than the window
of opportunity. How long is the window of opportunity? Unfortunately, this
depends strongly on the carbon resource scarcity that we know little about. If
the in-ground carbon stock is large (IEC or SIEC scenario), the window is long
enough. But a stock that large implies tiny scarcity rents today, which seems
to be at odds with the data. Hence, the window may be considerably shorter,
meaning that the possibility of a strong green paradox is at least a matter of con-
cern. Still, even within the implementation time slot, a sooner implementation
is a welfare improvement compared to a later implementation.
Chapter 2
When will Higher Interest Payments
Lead to More Education?
with Frederik Noack
Abstract: Based on observations from field studies in fishing communities in In-
dia, we include a fragmented credit market into a two-sector, two-period model
with common pool externalities to establish conditions under which credit mar-
ket distortions either increase or decrease education. We show that higher in-
terest payments increase education if their negative effect on capital investment
and therefore labor productivity in low-skilled production outweighs their pos-
itive effect on subjective discounting and therefore the present value of high-
skilled production. Positive common pool externalities from reduced capital
investment in low-skilled production can counterbalance the impact of capi-
tal changes on low-skilled labor productivity and therefore on education. The
overall outcome depends on the affected interest factor, the household’s initial
wealth and the common pool externality.
Key Words: Informal Distorted Credit Markets, Secured Loan, Human Capital, Child
Labor, Education, Common Pool Resources
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2.1 Introduction
One of the most pressing global challenges is poverty reduction. In addressing
this challenge, a focus on human capital formation is one of the most promising
approaches (Lucas, 1988; Galor, 2011; Hanushek and Woessmann, 2008; Becker
et al., 2011). Although there are substantial returns to education, ranging from
7 to 20 % increase in income per year of schooling (Psacharopoulos and Patri-
nos, 2004; Duflo, 2001; Banerjee and Duflo, 2005), education levels are still low
in most developing countries and cause 20 % of the cross-country differences
in output per worker (Schoellman, 2012). Many children and adolescents con-
tribute to the household’s income instead of going to school, partly because
credit markets for the poor are informal, fragmented and cannot facilitate opti-
mal investment allocation (Banerjee and Duflo, 2005). Households may invest
too little in education if the direct and opportunity costs of education are high
and credit markets are absent (Baland and Robinson, 2000; Ranjan, 1999, 2001),
but improved credit markets do not necessarily lead to more education. Empir-
ical evidence is mixed. While Dehejia and Gatti (2005) and Beegle et al. (2006)
suggest that improving credit markets increases investment in education and
reduces child labor, Islam and Choe (2013) and Maldonado and González-Vega
(2008) show that increasing access to credits increases child labor and reduces
investment in education. Banerjee et al. (2010) find no effect of microcredit on
education, while Holvoet (2004) finds positive effects of microfinance on edu-
cation but only if the loans are received through a women’s group.
Fragmented credit markets and poorly defined property rights often co-exist in
developing economies (Banerjee and Duflo, 2005). Further, many of the glob-
ally poor depend on common pool resources such as rangelands, forests and
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fish stocks for their incomes (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005; Das-
gupta, 2010). The occupational choices of the individuals are therefore often
interdependent via common pool externalities. Growing resource-dependent
production may induce resource degradation and impose a negative external-
ity on the resource users. Labor reallocation from the resource-dependent to the
resource-independent sector may increase the resource abundance and thus the
productivity of the resource-dependent sector.
We argue in this paper that the effect of credit market improvements on ed-
ucation depends a) on the affected interest factor, b) on the initial wealth of
the household and c) on the presence of common pool externalities. Based on
observations from our field study on fishing communities around Chilika la-
goon, India, we include a fragmented credit market into a two sector, two pe-
riod model with common pool externalities to establish conditions under which
credit market improvements either increase or decrease education.
Informal credit markets around Chilika lagoon consist of three main segments.
Money lenders offer loans not tied to a special purpose at high interest rates.
Fish traders, and to a lesser extent microfinance organizations and cooperatives,
offer lower priced loans for tangible business investments where the productive
investments serve as collateral. Since human capital cannot be seized in case of
default, higher future income due to education does not count as collateral.
The third segment comprises saving, but it is poorly developed. Credit markets
around Chilika lagoon are not exceptional. Credit markets in developing coun-
tries are often distorted and interest rates differ depending on the purpose of
the loan and the lender (Bardhan and Udry, 1999a, , Chapter 7). Credit markets
are also often interlinked with other markets (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990a; Ghosh
et al., 2000), especially when debtor and creditor are interdependent in trade
and production (Basu, 1997). Our model includes a low interest rate for saving,
an intermediate interest rate for borrowing secured by a seizable collateral in
form of a business investment and a high interest rate for unsecured borrowing
to capture the fragmented credit markets.
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Our model is close to the model of Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2011) who in-
clude two different loan types in their model, but allow a higher future income
due to education as collateral. Jafarey and Lahiri (2002) also study the impact
of credit market distortions on child labor but their focus is on the effectiveness
of trade sanctions to reduce child labor. Further, our approach resembles Du-
mas (2013), who analyzes the effects of market imperfections on child labor but
in contrast to our study focuses on labor market imperfection and adapts an
empirical approach to determine the sign of the unclear effects. Also, Bhalotra
and Heady (2003) find that land holdings increase child labor but as far as we
know only Bluffstone (2008) discusses child labor and common pool resources.
He finds that improved common property forest management increases child
labor.
Our results show that the activity of the representative household on the credit
market depends on its initial wealth. The household saves for very high lev-
els of initial wealth and becomes inactive on the financial market if its initial
wealth falls below a certain level. The household borrows money for the low
interest factor to invest in low-skilled production if the initial wealth reduces
further. The household borrows money for investment and consumption us-
ing secured and unsecured credits if it is endowed with comparably very low
levels of initial wealth. The main results are that changes in the interest fac-
tors have different effects on the household’s time allocation depending on its
wealth level, the interest factor and the common pool externality. A very poor
household increases education if the unsecured interest factor decreases, but
reduces education if the secured interest factor decreases. The latter result be-
comes ambiguous in the presence of common pool externalities. The effect of a
decreasing secured interest factor on time allocation is ambiguous if the house-
hold uses only loans secured by a collateral. The same holds true for changes in
the interest factor for saving for rich households that save. Results now depend
on the partial output elasticities, the elasticity of substitution between capital
and labor in the low-skilled sector, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
as well as the interest factor.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the
model framework and Section 2.3 presents the results without common pool
resources. Section 2.4 introduces a common pool resource and presents the new
results. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 The Model
We consider a two-period model of an economy with distorted credit markets
and a high-skilled as well as a low-skilled sector. A representative household in-
elastically supplies one unit of labor each period. The household allocates labor
between low-skilled production and education in the first period and between
low- and high-skilled production in the second period. We assume that educa-
tion is a prerequisite for working in the high-skilled sector. The share of labor
allocated to education in the first period equals therefore the share of time allo-
cated to high-skilled production in the second period. The time share allocated
to low-skilled production is also the same in both periods. In the following, we
describe production, markets and the household in more detail.
2.2.1 Production
Production in the low-skilled sector uses physical capital k and labor l. The
low-skilled sector produces output h(l, k) using a strictly increasing and strictly
concave technology that satisfies the Inada conditions. Production in the high-
skilled sector uses educated labor b as input with the production technology
w(b) and b = 1− l. The production technology w is also strictly increasing and
strictly concave and satisfies the Inada conditions.
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2.2.2 Markets
Demand for output is perfectly elastic at constant prices. Labor markets are
nonexistent for low-skilled labor, while credit markets are present, but dis-
torted. The household chooses the amount s ≥ 0 it saves at a fixed interest
factor φ, the amount it borrows v ≥ 0 constrained by the collateral k according
to
v ≤ k (2.1)
at the fixed interest factor τ and the amount z ≥ 0 it borrows at the fixed interest
factor ι with
1 < φ < τ < ι < ∞. (2.2)
The investment in physical capital constrains the loan size v at the intermedi-
ate interest factor τ. The unsecured loan z reflects the possibility for a second,
unconstrained, but higher-priced loan. In other words, credit supply is per-
fectly elastic at the interest factor τ as long as the capital investment serves
as collateral. For a loan that exceeds the capital investment, credit supply is
perfectly elastic at the higher interest factor ι. We use the simplification of un-
constrained borrowing without collateral to focus on the secured loan, but to
still capture the fragmented nature of the credit market. Furthermore, we ab-
stract from asymmetric information which may cause moral hazard or adverse
selection. We suppose that the threat of taking away the productive investment
poses enough incentives to repay the loan.
2.2.3 The Representative Household
The household is endowed with exogenously given initial wealth κ ≥ 0 and one
unit of labor per period. Following Jafarey and Lahiri (2002) and Bhalotra and
Heady (2003), we model the household as a single decision maker and abstract
from intra-household bargaining on time allocation. One interpretation is that
the household head sees schooling as an investment and decides on how much
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to invest such that there is a trade-off between child labor and schooling. We
abstract from other educational costs.
The household can invest in physical capital for the low-skilled activity at the
beginning of the first period. Capital lasts without depreciation until the end of
the second period and depreciates completely thereafter. This way, the invest-
ment represents a durable good that lenders allow as collateral.
The household has strictly convex, strictly monotone and homothetic prefer-
ences. Preferences can thus be represented by a strictly quasi-concave and linear
homogeneous utility function u(c1, c2) that is strictly increasing in consumption
in period one, c1, and period two, c2, and satisfies the Inada conditions. All in-
comes, capital, loans, savings and initial wealth are measured in units of the
consumption good.
The household maximizes utility u(c1, c2) subject to
c1 + k + s ≤ h(l, k) + κ + v + z
c2 + τv + ιz ≤ h(l, k) + w(1− l) + φs,
v ≤ k
(2.3)
with non-negative variables k, v, l, s, z, c1 and c2. The corresponding Lagrangian
is
y(c1, c2, l, k, v, z, s,λ1,λ2,λ3) = u(c1, c2)
+ λ1[h(l, k) + κ + v + z− c1 − k− s]
+ λ2[h(l, k) + w(1− l) + φs− c2 − τv− ιz]
+ λ3(k− v)
(2.4)
with shadow prices for consumption λ1 and λ2 in the first and second period,
respectively, and shadow price λ3 for the capital constraint of the secured loan.
In the next section, we derive the optimal solution.
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2.2.4 Optimality Conditions
In the following, we omit the arguments of the functions writing h instead of
h(l, k) and so on. Further, we use subscripts to denote partial derivatives. For
marginal utilities, we write u1 for ∂u/∂c1 and u2 for ∂u/∂c2. The Kuhn-Tucker
optimality conditions are
u1 − λ1 = 0
u2 − λ2 = 0
λ1hl + λ2(hl + wl) = 0
λ1(hk − 1) + λ2hk + λ3 = 0
λ1 − λ2τ − λ3 ≤ 0, v ≥ 0, v(λ1 − λ2τ − λ3) = 0
λ1 − λ2ι ≤ 0, z ≥ 0, z(λ1 − λ2ι) = 0
− λ1 + λ2φ ≤ 0, s ≥ 0, s(−λ1 + λ2φ) = 0
h + v + z + κ − c1 − s− k ≥ 0, λ1 ≥ 0, λ1(h + v + z + κ − c1 − s− k) = 0
h + w + sφ− c2 − vτ − zι ≥ 0, λ2 ≥ 0, λ2(h + w + sφ− c2 − vτ − zι) = 0
k− v ≥ 0, λ3 ≥ 0, λ3(k− v) = 0
(2.5)
where the equality of the first four conditions follows from the Inada conditions.
We define the household’s consumption discount factor as
f :=
u1
u2
=
λ1
λ2
(2.6)
that displays the price, in terms of period two goods, for an extra unit of a
period one good the household is willing to pay to shift a marginal income unit
between periods. It equals the relevant market interest factor if the household
is not credit constrained.
The household’s discount factor depends on its initial wealth level. A poorer
household has a higher discount factor and will borrow even at high interest
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costs. A richer household has a lower discount factor, may not borrow, but
may save. The model features five possible credit regimes that are related to
the initial wealth level. The resulting discount factors are depicted in Figure
2.1. The different credit regimes follow from the Kuhn-Tucker conditions (see
Appendix B.1) and will be described in the following.
FIGURE 2.1: Discounting, Credit Market Regimes and Initial Wealth.
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The proof is given in Appendix B.2
The five credit regimes from low to high initial wealth:
1. Two loans regime (TL): z > 0, v = k, s = 0, f = ι and λ3λ2 = ι − τ: The
household exhausts the secured loan and takes out an additional loan.
2. Exhausted loan regime (EL): z = 0, v = k, s = 0, τ ≤ f ≤ ι and λ3λ2 = f − τ:
The household exhausts the secured loan, but does not take an additional
loan.
3. One loan regime (OL): z = 0, k > v > 0, s = 0, f = τ and λ3 = 0: The
household takes out a secured loan, but does not exhaust it.
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4. No credit market activities regime (NO): z = 0, v = 0, s = 0, φ ≤ f ≤ τ
and λ3 = 0: The household neither borrows nor lends.
5. Saving regime (SA): z = 0, v = 0, s > 0, f = φ and λ3 = 0: The household
saves.
Obviously, the household does not save and borrow at the same time. Starting
in the TL-regime, a relatively richer household has a smaller unsecured loan
compared to a poorer household in the TL-regime such that for both f = ι
(compare Figure 2.1). For some wealth level, the EL-regime is reached. Then,
labor allocation and capital investment, and therefore the secured loan as well,
differ depending on initial wealth. The richer the household, the smaller the
household’s discount factor until the OL-regime is reached. In the OL-regime,
the size of the secured loan depends on initial wealth and keeps f = τ. In the
NO-regime, k and l vary again for different initial wealth levels. If the initial
wealth of the household is large, saving becomes the optimal choice and the
household is in the SA regime. The amount saved depends on initial wealth
such that f = φ.
In other words, credit demand declines from v = k and z > 0, to v = k and
z = 0, to k > v > 0 and z = 0 as the household’s discount factor decreases
from f = ι to ι ≥ f ≥ τ to f = τ. As the household’s discount factor decreases
further, the household does not use the credit market until f = φ, when it starts
to save. While all five credit regimes can theoretically occur, it depends on the
parameter combinations if all regimes occur for positive and finite initial wealth
levels.
Optimal capital investment and labor allocation depend on the subjective dis-
count factor as depicted by the first order conditions
hl(1+ f )− w1−l = 0,
hk(1+ f )− τ = 0 for the TL-, EL- and OL- regimes and
hk(1+ f )− f = 0 for the NO- and SA-regimes.
(2.7)
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The condition for optimal labor allocation applies in all credit-regimes, while
the first first order condition for capital investment only applies in the TL-, EL-
and OL-regime and the second only applies in the NO- and SA-regime. The
first order condition for labor equates the discounted marginal returns to labor
in low-skilled production with returns to labor in high-skilled production. The
first order conditions for capital equate marginal discounted returns of capital
in low-skilled production with the marginal costs of capital. Capital investment
and labor allocation differ between the credit regimes.
2.3 Interest Factors and Labor Allocation
In this section, we analyze the impact of credit market improvements in the
form of lower interest factors on time allocation between low-skilled labor and
education. Lower interest factors increase welfare of the indebted household
by decreasing interest payments. However, resulting changes in education lev-
els may affect future generations negatively as lower education leads to lower
future incomes and the household head neither considers the full adult life of
his children nor future generations.
We consider how changes in ι, τ and φ affect education in the five different
credit regimes. Since education is defined as 1− l, changes in education and
low-skilled work, l, have opposite signs. We introduce α := hl l/h as the output
elasticity of labor in low-skilled production and 1− α := hkk/h as the output
elasticities of capital in low-skilled production. Further, we define the elasticity
of substitution between capital and labor in low-skilled production by
σ :=
d ln(l/k)
d ln(hk/hl)
and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption by
η :=
d ln(c2/c1)
d ln(u1/u2)
.
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TABLE 2.1: Low-Skilled Work and Interest Factor Changes.
Credit Regime sgn (dl/dι) sgn (dl/dτ) sgn (dl/dφ)
TL >0 <0 =0
EL =0 =sgn
(
σ
(
f+ c2c1
1+ f
)
− 1− ηc2f h
)
=0
OL =0 = sgn
(
τ − 1−αα
)
=0
NO =0 =0 =0
SA =0 =0 =sgn
(
φ− 1−αα
)
The proofs are in the Appendix B.4.
To determine the direction of change in low-skilled work due to a change in
interest factors, we take the total differential of the first order conditions (2.7)
and reduce it to
sgn
(
dl j
di
)
= sgn(−y∗liy∗kk + y∗kiy∗lk), (2.8)
where l j denotes the time allocated to low-skilled work in credit regime j ∈
{TL, EL, OL, NO, SA}, the interest factors are given by i ∈ {φ, τ, ι} and y∗ de-
notes the maximized Lagrangian with first derivatives y∗l and y
∗
k . Appendix B.3
provides a detailed derivation of the expression. The results for dl j/di are sum-
marized in Table 2.1 and differ depending on the credit regime and the affected
interest factor (see Appendix B.4 for a detailed derivation).
The following mechanisms determine the results. A change in an interest fac-
tor may affect the costs of capital as well as discounting. The former leads to a
change in production patterns, while the latter may affect both production and
consumption. We identify three effects that determine the direction of change
in labor allocation and term them ‘productivity effect’ (a change in production
patterns due to a change in capital costs), ‘intertemporal effect’ (a change in pro-
duction patterns due to a change in discounting), and ‘credit constraint effect’
(a change in consumption pattern due to a change in discounting).
The productivity effect captures the impact of changes in capital investment
on labor productivity in the low-skilled sector. Capital investment adjusts to
changes in its market price τ (in the TL-,EL-,OL-regimes) or opportunity costs
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φ (in the SA-regime). If the interest factor for saving φ increases, saving be-
comes more attractive relative to investment in the low-skilled sector. If capital
costs τ or opportunity costs of capital φ increase, capital investment and thus
low-skilled labor productivity decrease. The productivity effect decreases low-
skilled labor and increases education.
The intertemporal effect captures the effect of changes in subjective discount-
ing on production patterns. If the subjective discount factor increases, the value
of present day income increases such that more capital is invested to increase
low-skilled income. The same is true for labor such that the intertemporal effect
increases low-skilled labor and decreases education.
The credit constraint effect only occurs if credit constraints bind and intertem-
poral consumption allocation via credit markets is limited. The household uses
labor reallocation to smooth consumption over time. Two counteracting sub-
effects arise. Higher capital costs imply that a larger amount has to be repaid in
the second period such that the household increases education while decreasing
low-skilled work. However, higher capital costs imply a smaller loan amount,
such that less has to be repaid in the second period and education decrease
while low-skilled work increases.
We now consider the prevalence of the effects for the different combinations
of interest factor changes and credit regimes. In the TL-regime, the household
discounts with f = ι and faces capital costs τ. Using (2.8) to evaluate the impact
of an increasing unsecured interest factor ι on time allocation in the TL-regime
yields
sgn
(
dlTL
dι
)
= sgn(
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
(hkhlk − hlhkk)(1+ ι)︸ ︷︷ ︸
intertemporal effect
).
Low-skilled work increases and education declines. This is a standard result.
A change in the unsecured interest factor ι does not affect capital costs τ (no
productivity effect), but it affects discounting. Consumption patterns are not
affected because the household is not credit constrained (no credit constraint
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effect), but production patterns are affected. Thus, the intertemporal effect de-
termines the overall change. The time allocations in all other credit market
regimes are unaffected by a change of ι because capital costs and subjective dis-
counting are independent of ι in all but the TL-regime.
If the secured interest factor τ in the TL-regime increases instead, the labor al-
location changes according to
sgn
(
dlTL
dτ
)
= sgn(
<0︷ ︸︸ ︷
−hlk(1+ ι)︸ ︷︷ ︸
productivity effect
)
and low-skilled work decreases, while education increases. Discounting is not
affected and neither an intertemporal nor a credit constraint effect occur. Since
the capital costs τ are affected, the productivity effect is present and determines
the overall change.
All three effects occur if the secured interest factor τ changes in the EL-regime.
The household is credit constrained and the secured interest factor depicts the
capital costs and is part of the subjective discount factor. Using (2.8) yields
sgn
(
dlEL
dτ
)
= sgn(
<0︷︸︸︷
fτ︸︷︷︸
c. constr. e.
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
(hkhlk − hlhkk)(1+ f )︸ ︷︷ ︸
intertemp. e.
<0︷ ︸︸ ︷
−hlk(1+ f )︸ ︷︷ ︸
prod. e.
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
− fkhl︸ ︷︷ ︸
c. constr. e.
),
(2.9)
which becomes
sgn
(
σ
(
f + c2c1
1+ f
)
− 1− ηc2
f h
)
(2.10)
after some calculus (see Appendix B.4 for details). Expression (2.10) is positive
for a small elasticities of intertemporal substitution η or a large elasticities of
substitution in low-skilled production σ. It is negative for a large η and a small
σ. A small elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in low- skilled
production implies a low substitutability between input factors. Thus, if capital
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is reduced due to an increase in τ, it is costly to compensate capital with low-
skilled work. The productivity effect dominates and a higher interest factor
leads to less low-skilled work and more education.
In the OL-regime, the secured interest factor τ represents the discount factor as
well as capital costs and
sgn
(
dlOL
dτ
)
= sgn(
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
(hkhlk − hlhkk)(1+ τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
intertemporal effect
<0︷ ︸︸ ︷
−hlk(1+ τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
productivity effect
), (2.11)
which becomes
sgn
(
dlOL
dτ
)
sgn
(
τ − 1− α
α
)
(2.12)
after rearrangement and substituting in the output elasticities of capital and
labor (A detailed derivation is given in Appendix B.4). Since the household is
not credit constrained, only the intertemporal and the productivity effect occur.
Both effects draw in different directions such that the change of low-skilled
work is ambiguous. Equation (2.12) implies that the effect of a higher interest
factor on low-skilled labor is negative for α < 1/(1 + τ), and positive for α >
1/(1 + τ). The increase of the secured interest factor leads to more education
and less low-skilled work if the productivity effect dominates the intertemporal
effect, i.e. if the output elasticity of labor in the low-skilled sector is sufficiently
small with α < 1/(1+ τ).
An increasing secured interest factor in the NO- and the SA-regimes has no ef-
fect on time allocation as it neither affects the subjective discount factor nor the
capital costs in these regimes. The same applies for changes of the saving inter-
est factor and time allocation in the TL-, EL-, OL- and NO-regimes. The effect
of an increasing interest factor for saving on time allocation in the SA-regime is
equivalent to the effect of an increasing interest factor for borrowing secured by
a collateral in the OL-regime. The household is not credit constrained and the
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interest factor on saving φ represents the discount factor as well as the oppor-
tunity costs of capital.
2.4 Common Pool Externalities
In this section, we consider additionally a common pool resource with poorly
defined property rights. Low-skilled production depends on a regenerative re-
source, but high-skilled production is resource-independent. A fixed number of
potential resource users has unrestricted access to the resource and the number
of resource users is sufficiently large to avoid strategic behavior. Low-skilled
production of the representative household is given by h¯(l, k, x) = h(l, k)x with
‘effort’ h(l, k) and the resource stock x. The multiplicative combination of effort
and the resource stock is a common assumption in resource economics (Han-
nesson, 1983; Clark, 2005; Conrad, 2010) and simplifies the subsequent analysis.
Aggregate harvest reduces the stock size of the resource such that x is a function
of aggregate labor L and aggregate capital K with xK < 0 and xL < 0. Due to
the large number of resource users, each harvester neglects its individual effect
on the resource stock and the first order conditions become
hl(1+ f )x− w1−l = 0,
hk(1+ f )x− τ = 0 for the TL-,EL- and OL- regimes and
hk(1+ f )x− f = 0 for the NO- and SA-regimes.
(2.13)
Resource dynamics differ largely in their speed. Forest growth can be very
slow whereas the dynamics of rangelands or some fish species are relatively
fast compared to a human lifetime. Our work is motivated by the Indian inland
fishery of Chilika lagoon where catches increased several fold within two years
after an ecological regime shift. We therefore suppose a fast growing resource
for our model and assume that the resource reaches its steady state immediately
at the beginning of each period for a given level of aggregate harvesting effort.
The resource stock will be the same in both periods because l and k do not
WHEN WILL HIGHER INTEREST PAYMENTS LEAD TO MORE EDUCATION? 53
differ between periods. To simplify the analysis further, we assume identical
harvesters of mass one such that L = l and K = k. We define the stock elasticity
that measures the response of the steady state resource stock to harvesting effort
as
ε = −xhh
x
. (2.14)
The stock elasticity is a measure for the common pool externality and increases
with the impact of the harvest on the steady state stock size. The stock elasticity
is high for resources with low reproduction rates and low density dependent
mortality rates such as whales. It is high for resources with low depletion rates
such as fertile soil or resources with high reproduction rates and high density
dependent mortality rates such as some fish species. There is no common pool
externality for ε = 0 and the results are as in Table 2.1.
The direction of the overall effect of interest factor changes on time allocation
is still determined by (2.8), but with the first order conditions (2.13) instead of
(2.7). Although the individual harvester neglects his impact on the resource, his
marginal productivity of capital and labor in (2.13) is still affected by changes
in the resource abundance. He thus takes into account that the resource reacts
to effort changes resulting from interest factors changes. Table 2.2 summarizes
the change in low-skilled work in response to interest factor changes for the
different credit regimes. Appendix B.5 derives the results.
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The results of Table 2.2 differ from the results of Table 2.1, because of the re-
source effect. The resource effect reflects the impact of changes in the resource
stock size on marginal labor productivity in low-skilled production and repre-
sents the negative externality of harvesting. If capital investment in the har-
vesting sector decreases as a response to rising capital costs, the resource stock
recovers and marginal labor productivity in low-skilled production increases.
The resource effect therefore draws in the opposite direction as the productiv-
ity effect and occurs only when the productivity effect also occurs. This implies
that the resource effect only occurs in the TL-, EL- and OL-regime as a response
to a change in the secured interest factor as well as in the SA-regime as a re-
sponse to a change in the savings interest factor. All other cases are unaffected
by the introduction of a common pool externality. If the secured interest factor
changes in the TL-regime, the direction of change in low-skilled work is deter-
mined by
sgn
(
dlTL
dτ
)
= sgn(
<0︷ ︸︸ ︷
−hlkx(1+ ι)︸ ︷︷ ︸
productivity effect
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
−hlxk(1+ ι)︸ ︷︷ ︸
resource effect
) = sgn
(
ε− 1
σ
)
.
The sign of dlTL/dτ depends on the relative size of the two elasticities. A large
stock elasticity implies that the resource recovers strongly after a reduction in
total harvesting capital which increases the marginal productivity of labor and
increases the time allocated to low-skilled labor. A large substitution elasticity
in the low-skilled sector implies that capital can easily be substituted by labor
which also increases the time that is allocated to low-skilled production.
The direction of change in labor allocated to low-skilled production in the EL-
regime as a response to an increase of the secured interest factor is determined
by
sgn
(
dl
dτ
)
= sgn( fτ
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1+ f )(hkxhlkx− hlxhkkx)︸ ︷︷ ︸
intertemp. e.
− fkhlx
<0︷ ︸︸ ︷
−(1+ f )hlkx︸ ︷︷ ︸
prod. e.
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
−(1+ f )hlxk︸ ︷︷ ︸
resource e.
).
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Rearrangement and substituting in the elasticities yield
sgn
(
σ
(
f + c2c2
1+ f
)
− 1− ηc2
f hx
+ εσ
(
ηc2
f hx
+
1− c2c1
1+ f
))
.
As without the resource externality, low-skilled labor decreases for a secured
interest factor increase if the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital
in the low-skilled sector is low. The resource externality has a positive impact
on the time allocated towards low-skilled work in most cases as the secured
interest factor increases. The effect of the resource externality on changes in
low-skilled labor is only negative if consumption increases strongly over time.
The direction of change in low-skilled work in the OL-regime is determined by
sgn
(
dl
dτ
)
= sgn(
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1+ τ)(hkxhlkx− hlxhkkx)︸ ︷︷ ︸
intertemp. e.
<0︷ ︸︸ ︷
−(1+ τ)hlkx︸ ︷︷ ︸
prod. e.
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
−(1+ τ)xkhl︸ ︷︷ ︸
resource e.
)
which is equivalent to
sgn
(
dl
dτ
)
= sgn
(
1
σ
(
τ
(1− α)(1+ τ) − 1
)
+ ε
)
.
The expression is positive for a large substitution elasticity in low-skilled pro-
duction σ or a large stock elasticity ε.
It can only become negative for τ < (1− α)/α and a small σ or a small ε. As in
the case without resource externality, the condition for results in the SA-regime
are the same as in the OL-regime with φ instead of τ.
A strong resource externality leads to a strong recovery of the resource as capi-
tal is withdrawn from resource harvesting which has a positive effect on labor
productivity in the low-skilled sector. Thus, a large common pool externality,
i.e. a large ε, leads to an increase of low-skilled labor with increasing interest
factors. In other words, credit market reforms that lower interest factors are
more likely to increase education in the presence of common pool externalities.
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2.5 Conclusion
This article examines the impact of interest rate changes on low-skilled labor
and education in developing economies with and without common pool re-
sources. Our model is motivated by the fragmented credit markets in fishing
villages around Chilika Lagoon, India, which are typical for informal credit
markets in developing economies. While it seems natural to respond to the
observed low education and high rural interest rates by improving credit mar-
kets, we have shown that lower interest rates can actually decrease education.
The mechanism leading to this result is the ‘productivity effect’: lower capital
costs increase investment in the low-skilled sector, which increases marginal
productivity of low-skilled labor. Counteracting mechanisms are that lower
subjective discounting increases the present value of future benefits from edu-
cation and that resource externalities lower or reverse the productivity effect.
Which of these effects occur depends on the household’s initial wealth, the af-
fected interest factor and the presence of common pool externalities. Which of
the occurring effects dominates, depends on the substitutability of labor and
capital in low-skilled production, the interest rate, the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution in consumption and on the size of the common pool external-
ity. Credit market improvements are more likely to increase education if capital
can easily replace labor in low-skilled production, if the output share of capi-
tal is high, the household has low preferences for consumption smoothing, the
interest rates are high and there are strong common pool externalities.
Interest factor reductions that decrease capital costs and increase investment in
low-skilled production improve the welfare of the current generation. The pol-
icy may, however, negatively affect future generations if parents do not consider
the full life of their offspring and if higher capital investment increases child-
labor in low-skilled production. Credit market improvements are unequivo-
cally beneficial if their negative effect on subjective discounting outweighs the
positive effects on child-labor productivity such that education increases.
Chapter 3
Estimating the Insurance Premium
in Interlinked Credit-Output
Contracts
Abstract: On informal credit markets, one often observes a type of credit that
does not base interest payments on the loan amount, but on income flows
(interlinked credit-output contract). This can be understood as a risk sharing
mechanism where interest payments include an insurance premium. This pa-
per shows that the premium increases with the income volatility. Based on
observations from small-scale fishing communities around Chilika lagoon, In-
dia, the paper also confirms the finding empirically. Furthermore, in contrast
to pure credit contracts, interlinked contracts allow fishing boats as collateral
around Chilika lagoon. This reduces their interest rate. It explains why inter-
linked interest rates turn out to be of similar size as micro finance interest rates
even though the former include an insurance component.
Key Words: Informal Credit Markets, Credit-Output Interlinkages, Regression Analy-
sis, Risk Sharing, Small-Scale Fishery, India
JEL classification: O16, O17, Q22
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3.1 Introduction
Credit markets have the important role of financing investment, of smoothing
consumption and, in the case of incomplete insurance markets, of providing
some kind of coverage. The need for credit transactions is strongest where
households are poorest (Bardhan and Udry, 1999b), and risk has a higher im-
portance in the everyday life of the poor (Besley, 1995). Formal credit and in-
surance is low in poor areas as formal institutions are rarely existent. Infor-
mal arrangements close the gap. One example are credits with interest pay-
ments based on income flows, which are often offered by wholesale traders.
These credit contracts do not have explicit interest rates, but the borrowers sell
their output to the wholesale trader at below market prices. Crow and Mur-
shid (1992, 1994) document these arrangements for the agricultural sector in
Bangladesh, while Minten et al. (2012) and Bell and Srinivasan (1989) do so
for India. This paper reports similar arrangements for small-scale fishing com-
munities around Chilika lagoon, India. Contracts that jointly determine the
transaction conditions in at least two markets are called ‘interlinked’ contracts
(Bell, 1988). These interlinked contracts constitute a risk sharing arrangement
(Stiglitz, 1974c). In the case of credit-output interlinkages, interest payments are
lower (higher) when income flows are lower (higher). As traders provide the
lion’s share of informal credit (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1997), this practice deserves
attention, especially with respect to the implicit interest rate. One would expect
this interest rate to somehow reflect the risk sharing element of the interlinked
contracts. One would also expect the interest rate to account for transaction cost
savings due to the interaction of borrower and lender on more than one market.
Crow and Murshid (1992, 1994) and Bell et al. (1997) provide evidence that
interest rates from interlinked contracts lie above other relevant rates, but re-
gression analyses only exist for interest rate formation of money lenders (e.g.
Mallick (2012); Iqbal (1988)) and micro finance institutions (e.g. Baquero et al.
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(2012))1. Minten et al. (2012) are one exemption in that they use a regression
analysis to compare interlinked contracts to non-interlinked contracts. They
do not calculate implicit interest rates, but compare prices on the output mar-
kets: they include a dummy that is one for loan use in the last five years in a
regression to explain output prices. The coefficient of the dummy is insignifi-
cant, thus, they conclude that interlinkages do not lead to lower implicit out-
put prices. However, this result could also stem from the fact that borrowers
already repaid their loan. No study considers a possible effect from sharing in-
come risk on interlinked interest rates even though that is the main theoretical
explanation for interlinked contracts, and risk is an important element in the
everyday life of the poor.
This paper is to test empirically if the interest rates from interlinked contracts
increase with the borrower’s income volatility. The idea is that a higher income
volatility reflects higher income risk. This constitutes a test of the theoretical
prediction that interlinked credit-output contracts are a risk sharing mecha-
nism and that this contract form provides some kind of insurance leading to
consumption smoothing. The analysis is based on observations from small-
scale fishing communities around Chilika lagoon, India. Furthermore, to my
knowledge, this paper is the first one to calculate implicit interest rates from
interlinked credit-output contracts for a small-scale fishery and not for agricul-
ture.
Regression results show that borrowers pay the lender for sharing the risk
through an insurance premium that takes the form of an interest rate mark-
up. The insurance premium increases with the borrower’s income volatility. A
theoretical model underpins the empirical results. Furthermore, the interaction
of lender and borrower on the credit and the fish market allow the lender to
take the fishing boat as collateral. As collaterals lead to lower interest rates, the
1Further, Ghatak (1983) analyzes rural interest rates on the state level. Hatlebakk (2009) only
takes one loan per household and explicitly excludes interlinked contracts.
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overall interest rate level in interlinked contracts compares to that of micro fi-
nance rates even though the former includes an insurance premium. Sensitivity
analysis confirms results.
The paper proceeds as follows: The next section (section 3.2) discusses informal
credit markets with interlinked credit-output contracts and presents a theoret-
ical model on interlinked credit contracts. Section 3.3 describes data collection
and the fishing villages around Chilika lagoon. It also characterizes the local
informal credit markets and calculates the implicit interest rates of interlinked
credit-output contracts. Section 3.4 estimates the insurance premium in the in-
terlinked contracts and section 3.5 concludes the paper.
3.2 Interlinked Credit-Output Contracts with Insur-
ance Premium
3.2.1 Informal Credit Markets and Interlinked Credit-Output
Contracts
Most theoretical literature on informal credit markets focuses on the explana-
tion of credit constraints and high interest rates (see e.g. Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981)) as yearly interest of 40 - 80 % are common on informal credit markets
(Duflo and Banerjee, 2010). The dominant explanations went from monopoly
power or perfect competition with high rates due to a high default probability
to the imperfect information view (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990b).
Asymmetric information implies that adverse selection and moral hazard may
lead to involuntary or strategic default. Adverse selection relates to the problem
that the lender generally cannot monitor well how the borrower is using the
loan. In the end, the borrower may not be able to repay the lender. In the case of
moral hazard, the borrower may not even want to repay the credit, even though
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he could, because enforcement mechanisms are weak. On markets with well-
developed institutions, legal mechanisms or the use of a well-defined collateral
ensure repayment.
On informal credit markets, formal enforcement mechanisms are weak, prop-
erty rights are often poorly defined and wealth put up as collateral is normally
not sufficient (see Ray (1998) for further discussions). Thus, lenders on informal
markets have to find other ways to ensure loan repayment.
Sometimes, informal lenders can accept collaterals that are not approved by the
formal sector (Ray, 1998). This is especially true for lenders who also do busi-
ness on other markets (see Bell (1988) and Bardhan (1980) for an overview on
interlinked contracts). They already know the borrower which reduces transac-
tion costs. Furthermore, they are in the special position to take specialized pro-
duction assets or future income flows as collateral, as e.g. discussed in Riekhof
and Noack (2014) and Hoff and Stiglitz (1997), respectively. In addition, if de-
fault is defined as an interruption in serving interest obligations, interlinked
credit-output contracts also reduce the default probability. This obviously suits
the lender, but also the borrower as a good credit history is important for future
loan supply.
As an interlinked credit generally involves that the borrower has to sell his out-
put to the lender, the trader also benefits from a more productive borrower in
the case of a productive investment. The trader has the first right to buy the
fish, but for whatever reason, he has no obligation to buy the whole output. An
interlinked contract is thus one way for traders to secure the quality of supply.
Traders do not employ the producer to keep up incentives, but as already men-
tioned, they share the risk. Risk-sharing allows a risk neutral lender to extract
payments in addition to credit costs as risk averse borrowers are willing to pay
an insurance premium for reduced income risk. The model in the next section
illustrates this. The insurance can also be interpreted as a consumption smooth-
ing mechanism as it reduces the income volatility over time.
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3.2.2 A Model with Interlinked Credit Contracts
The following model shows that risk averse borrowers always prefer an inter-
linked contract to a pure credit contract if interest payments are the same. This
allows traders to extract additional payments from the lender by offering in-
terlinked credit-output contracts, or in other words, by offering credit contracts
with an insurance component. The model further shows that the insurance pre-
mium is increasing in the borrower’s income volatility.
Consider a small-open economy in which two credit contract types are offered
that only differ with respect to their interest payment arrangements. One con-
tract is the standard credit contract that implies interest payments α, the α-
contract. Assume that the α-contract is always offered and that its interest rate
is fixed, i.e. determined in the rest of the economy. The other contract is an inter-
linked contract where interest payments occur in the form of the income share
1− β, the β-contract. The β-contract calls for a monitoring of the borrower’s
income as the borrower has an incentive to hide income parts to reduce interest
payments. Only traders can easily observe the borrower’s income and there-
fore have a monopoly on β-contracts. As the α-contracts are competitive and
represent the exit option for the borrower, the trader will choose a limit price
policy. He will set β so that the household just prefers the β- to the α-contract.
Now consider credit demand. Assume a risk averse, expected utility maximiz-
ing household i who faces stochastic income gi with expected income E(gi) = µi
and variance σ2i = E(g
2
i )− µ2i . I omit the subscript whenever this does not lead
to confusion. Furthermore, I assume µ− σ preferences. The µ− σ approach is
compatible with expected utility maximization if all distributions in the choice
set of the household belong to the same linear class or if the utility function
is quadratic (Sinn, 1990). For the first result, either of the two conditions may
hold.
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The household can choose between the two different credit contracts, the α-
contract and the β-contract. The household is indifferent between the two con-
tracts if
E[u(βg)] = E[u(g− α)] (3.1)
with u denoting the utility function representing the borrower’s preferences.
Assume the trader chooses β such that expected interest payments are equal to
α, i.e.
(1− β) E[g] = α. (3.2)
In this case
g− α = g− (1− β)E[g]. (3.3)
Using this in (3.1) yields:
E[u(βg)] ≥ E[u(g− (1− β) E[g])]. (3.4)
Considering µ-σ preferences, one only has to consider mean and variance
E[β g] = E[g]− (1− β) E[g] = β E[g] (3.5)
var[β g] = β var[g] (3.6)
var[g− (1− β) E[g]] = var[g]. (3.7)
Both contracts have the same mean (by construction), but the β-contract has the
lower variance. Thus, a risk-averse borrower who has mean-variance prefer-
ences will strictly prefer the β-contract. The trader can increase total payments
in the β-contract such that they are higher than in the α-contract. This gives the
first result: the borrower is willing to pay an insurance premium in addition to
the pure credit costs α.
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In case of var(g) = 0, the trader has to set β such that interest payments are
equal to α. This implies ∂(1− β)/∂σ > 0|var(g)=0. The insurance premium is
increasing in the variance.
To derive analytical results concerning the influence of the variance on β for
var(g) > 0, I assume preferences represented by the quadratic utility function
u(g) = g− λg2. Its form is problematic because the marginal utility turns neg-
ative as incomes become large. I therefore presume that marginal utility turns
negative only beyond the range in which g varies: I assume that u′(g˜) > 0 with
g˜ = βµ(1+ σ2/µ2), i.e.
∆ := 1− 2λβµ(1+ σ2/µ2) > 0.
Then, u′(g) > 0 for all g < g˜.
The households is indifferent between the two contracts if
E[u(g− α)] = E[u(βg)]
⇔ µ− α− λ(σ2 + (µ− α)2) = βµ− λβ2(σ2 + µ2). (3.8)
Again assume β > 0, i.e. a positive income of the household after interest pay-
ments. It follows from (3.8) that β < 1 for α > 0, µ − α = βµ for σ = 0 and
µ− α > βµ for σ > 0. The last inequality shows the existence of the insurance
premium in interlinked contracts. Further,
dβ
dσ2
=
λ(β2 − 1)
∆µ
< 0,
i.e. the trader’s share (1− β) increases with the variance of the income.
To compare different households, it may be more appropriate to consider rel-
ative income volatility. A useful measure for relative income volatility is the
coefficient of variation, Vi := σi/µi. Divide (3.8) by µi to obtain
1− αi
µi
− λµi(V2i + (1−
αi
µi
)2) = βi − λβ2i µi(V2i + 1)
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as well as
dβi
dVi
=
λµi2Vi(β2i − 1)
∆i
< 0.
This is the second result: borrowers with a higher coefficient of variation, i.e.
higher volatility relative to their expected income, pay a higher insurance pre-
mium given equal preferences.
In the next section, I describe the data used to test if the theoretical result that
borrowers with a higher coefficient of variation pay a higher insurance pre-
mium holds empirically.
3.3 A Small-scale Fishery and Informal Credit Mar-
kets
3.3.1 Data Collection
The dataset used in this analysis is based on a household survey Frederik Noack
and I conducted with an interviewer team in 17 fishing villages around Chilika
lagoon, Orissa, India, from February 21st to April 12th, 2011. Chilika lagoon is
located at the Bay of Bengal and is the largest coastal wetland ecosystem on
the Indian sub-continent (Mohapatra et al., 2007). The survey is part of the
‘Integrated Coastal Zone Management’ Program funded by the World Bank.
The area is particularly interesting for this study because most households are
indebted and interlinked credit-output contracts exist next to ‘pure’ credit con-
tracts. Furthermore, fishing income varies daily as well as across seasons, which
allows to test if a higher income variation leads to higher interlinked interest
rates.
To collect the information, we stratified the whole fishing community accord-
ing to ecological regions and village size. Within villages, we interviewed a
total of 509 randomly chosen household heads. In addition to the interviews,
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we conducted group discussions and spoke to local stakeholders like money
lenders, micro finance organizations and teachers. The data is particularly rich
in information on households’ fishing activities and on credit markets.
I take the credit contracts as observation units because one household can have
several loans. The dataset includes information on 727 credit contracts. Exclud-
ing outliers, observations with missing information and credit contracts taken
out before 2006 yields 450 observations for 316 households. Outlier detection
follows Barnett and Lewis (1984, page 159). The cut-off year 2006 is a decent
choice in the trade-off between a high number of observations and a short time
lag between raising the credit and the survey.
3.3.2 Chilika Lagoon Fisheries
Chilika lagoon is a brackish water body with salt water inflows from the sea
and fresh water inflows from rivers. This leads to four distinct ecological zones
that differ in their salinity level, their species diversity and their productivity
(Mohapatra et al., 2007). These zones are geographically separated into the
Northern, the Central, the Southern and the Outer Channel sector. The Chi-
lika Development Authority reports 32,530 active fishermen in 2010/11. Total
annual catches 2010/11 of fish, crab, shrimp and prawn were 13 thousand met-
ric tonnes (Directorate of Fisheries, 2013).
Predominantly male members go fishing in groups and share the catch. These
so-called ‘fishing units’ have, on average, three members. If not all members be-
long to the same household, they use different remuneration systems. In most
cases, the catch is divided into equal shares. The number of shares depends on
the remuneration of capital: each member receives one share, but often, the boat
owner receives an additional share. Sometimes, the net owner also receives an
additional share. This implies that the catch is divided into n, n + 1 or n + 2
equal shares with n displaying the number of fishing unit members. Paying
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TABLE 3.1: Remuneration of Fishing Collaborators Within Fishing Units.
Same Equal Add. share Add. share Pay Other/
family shares boat boat & net wage no
owner owner answer
Share of households
with a certain
remuneration
system in their 44.0 10.1 19.0 8.2 3.8 14.9
fishing unit
(in %)
TABLE 3.2: Share of Households that Belong to a Certain Subcaste.
Subcaste Keuta Kandara Khartia Pandu Nolia Other
Share 58.0 16.1 10.8 9.2 3.8 1.9
wages to collaborators is not very common. Table 3.1 gives an overview over
the frequency of the different remuneration systems.
Fishermen use different methods to target different species. Fishing methods
used to be related to the subcastes of the fishermen (see Table 3.2 for the dif-
ferent subcastes), but that system is not in place anymore. Most households
(82.3%) go fishing by boat. Fishing trips last on average two days. The caught
fish is usually brought to so-called landing centers, where fish traders buy the
fish and either transport it to national or international markets or re-sell it on
local markets.
Incomes are low and vary across the three seasons — summer, monsoon and
winter — as shown in Table 3.3. There is no lean season as e.g. in agriculture.
The average of the coefficient of variations of all households for the fishing in-
come in the different seasons is 0.52 with a standard deviation of 0.35 across
households.
Few households have an additional income source besides fishing. In those
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TABLE 3.3: Monthly Fishing Incomes Per Fishing Unit for the Three Seasons.
Season Summer Monsoon Winter
Average monthly
catch (Indian Rupees) 5436.8 6114.2 3616.0
per fishing unit
(≈ $) (108.7) (122.3) (72.3)
cases, fishermen usually work as unskilled laborer to supplement fishing in-
come.
3.3.3 Interest Rates of Interlinked Credit-Fish Contracts
Fish traders provide credits without direct interest payments, but with special
agreements about buying the fish from the borrower at a lower price. Calcu-
lations based on the borrower’s income loss due to selling the fish at a lower
price to the fish trader make these implicit interest rates explicit. To distinguish
a trader that lends money to a fisher from a trader that does not, I call the former
a ’trader-lender’.
Calculations of the interlinked interest rates are either based on income forgone
per day due to selling to the trader-lender instead of to another trader or on the
amount of Indian Rupees per kg per day the fisher looses due to selling to the
trader-lender instead of to another trader. In the first case, I multiply the income
forgone per day with the fishing days per month differentiated for the three sea-
sons and then sum over all months to attain the yearly interest payments. In the
second case, I multiply the amount lost with the catch in kilograms. The catch
in kilograms means the catch of the total fishing unit times the share the house-
hold receives according to the sharing mechanisms (see Table 3.1). Then again, I
multiply the amount lost per day with the fishing days per month differentiated
for the three seasons and then sum over all months to attain the yearly interest
payments. The principal is repaid separately. One could say that interest is paid
in fish and the principal is paid in money.
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Relating the resulting total yearly interest payments to the yearly fishing in-
come of the household gives the share the trader-lender receives as interest
payments. On average, the trader-lender receives 23.6%. Relating the yearly
interest payments to the loan amount gives the yearly interest rate. The aver-
age interest rate for a loan from a trader-lender is 28.0% p.a.
One difficulty is that possible repayments change the loan amount during the
year. The dataset only provides the initial loan amount and the amount that
still needs to be repaid, but these two values only differ in 25% of the cases.
The average debt from those loans that report a change is still close to 85%
of the initial amount. This suggests that relating the yearly interest payments
to the currently outstanding debt does not lead to a severe overestimation of
the interest rate. Furthermore, it is not unusual that the repayment of larger
investments takes several years. In the next section, I relate the information on
the trader-lender to other lender types.
3.3.4 Informal Credit Markets around Chilika Lagoon
Several lender types are available on the credit markets around Chilika lagoon,
which is typical for rural credit markets in less developed economies (see e.g.
Menkhoff et al. (2012)). Besides trader-lenders, who provide 24.2% of all loans,
money lenders, who provide 27.7% of all loans, and micro finance institutions,
who provide 26.4% of all loans, are important loan sources. Other loan sources
include cooperatives and banks as well as friends, neighbors and relatives.
Loan conditions vary a lot between the different lender types. In general, mi-
cro finance organizations only allow business loans. For fishermen, this implies
loans for fishing purposes. It may be difficult to ensure this restriction. Our
data shows that loans are indeed not only used for fishing purposes. One pe-
culiarity about micro finance loans is the rigid repayment structure that lowers
administration costs (Duflo and Banerjee, 2010). Around Chilika lagoon, over
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TABLE 3.4: Business Models of Different Lender Types.
Lender type Business model
Money lenders Individual screening, customized loan
Micro finance Standardized procedure
Fish traders Interlinked contracts, fishing asset and harvest as collateral
Friends, ... Everyday interaction, personal ties
Banks Individualized screening, formal collateral
Cooperatives
90% of the micro finance loans are repayed on a weekly basis. There are no spe-
cial conditions to attain a loan from a money lender. In addition, money lenders
seem to offer very customized loans. Banks normally require formal collateral,
like land, that most households cannot provide. Cooperatives used to be rather
active on the credit markets around Chilika lagoon, but at the moment, most
of them do not function anymore. Borrowing from and lending to people one
knows is very typical when other credit sources are rare. For an overview on
the different business models of the lender types see Table 3.4.
As it is also typical for many rural credit markets in less developed economies,
interest rates are high and loan amounts comparably small. Table 3.5 depicts the
average yearly interest rate as well as the average loan amount for the different
lender types. Interest rates are nominal and calculated as of 2011. The inflation
rate is around 10% p.a. based on the consumer price index for agricultural la-
borers in Orissa (Government of Orissa, 2011). On average, cooperatives charge
lowest and money lenders charge highest rates. The average yearly interest rate
obtained from fish traders lies between interest rates from banks and from mi-
cro finance institutions. Superficially, it seems that, on average, the insurance
premium is not shown in form of an interest rate mark-up as postulated by
the theoretical model in section 3.2.2. The empirical analysis in section 3.4 will,
however, reveal that an insurance premium in form of an interest rate mark-up
does exist, but that other effects reduce the interest rate from interlinked loans
as compared to other loans. The average loan amount is lowest from cooper-
atives and highest from banks, but the average amount lent by banks is still
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TABLE 3.5: Data on Credit Markets.
Lender type Share in total Average Mean interest
number of loans amount rate p.a.
Micro finances 30.7% 16355.1 Rs 32.8%
Money lenders 26.7% 35700.0 Rs 47.6%
Fish traders 23.8% 30773.0 Rs 28.0%
Friends, ... 7.3% 45666.7 Rs 42.8%
Banks 4.0% 54722.2 Rs 25.5%
Cooperatives 3.8% 13558.8 Rs 18.0%
small, roughly 1100 $. The average amount lent by fish traders is similar to the
amount lent by money lenders, roughly 620 $.
The most prominent mechanism to ensure repayment is violence (in 62.5% of
all loans). Further mechanisms include social sanctions and the threat to cut
off future credit supply. Only 2.5% of all loans are secured by formal collateral.
The secured loans are mainly loans from banks and cooperatives. In nearly all
cases, the collateral is in the form of land.
A share of 34.7%, 21.6%, 31.1% and 12.7% of the loans are by households liv-
ing in the Southern, the Northern, the Central and the Outer Channel sector,
respectively. This roughly represents the distribution of the surveyed house-
holds, which is based on the proportions of fishing households living in the
respective sectors.
Fishermen are self-employed such that households demand credit for produc-
tive as well as consumptive purposes. In the former case, one sometimes dif-
ferentiates between fixed and working capital (Ray, 1998). In the small scale
fishery, the need to finance fixed capital, like boats and nets, is relatively more
important because fishermen normally sell the fish the same day they catch it
such that the need for financing working capital is only relevant if they go on
longer fishing trips. Still, some households have working options outside of
fisheries where the financing of working capital may be important. Demand
for consumptive credit arises if income falls, for example due to seasonality in
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TABLE 3.6: Importance of Loan Purposes.
Loan purpose Share that has Share that has
certain purpose certain purpose
as main purpose as second purpose
Fishing activities 53.8% 1.2%
Consumption needs 19.6% -
Ceremonies 12.7% 1.2%
To pay other debts 2.7% -
Education of Children 2.4% 0.3%
Emergencies 1.5% 0.3%
Note that not all loans have more than one purpose. Less important purposes are not
reported in detail.
fish catches, a decrease in prices or fish stocks, or if consumption needs increase,
for example due to weddings, illness or death (Ray, 1998).
Most households (86.1 %, n=316) around Chilika lagoon are indebted and about
half of the indebted households have more than one loan. The main purposes
for taking out a loan for the fishery households around Chilika lagoon are fish-
ing activities as well as consumption needs (see Table 3.6). Education is not a
major loan purpose. Literacy levels around Chilika lagoon are low, only 65.5%
of all people older than 10 years are literate, still almost all (96%) households
have a literate household head.
3.4 Empirical Estimation of the Insurance Premium
in Credit-Fish Contracts
3.4.1 Baseline Results
This section empirically examines the hypothesis that interlinked credit-output
contracts include an insurance component. To be precise, the empirical model
examines if the interest rate of an interlinked contract increases with the bor-
rower’s income volatility as proposed by the theoretical model. This would be
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evidence for an insurance premium and for risk sharing in interlinked contracts
as suggested by Stiglitz (1974c).
For information on usual interest payments I include the interest rates from
‘pure’ credit contracts, i.e. α-contracts, in the analysis. The derivation of the
implicit interest rates of the interlinked contract, i.e. the β-contract, is described
in section 3.3.3.
To measure income volatility, I use the coefficient of variation V. This is in line
with the theoretical model of section 3.2.2. The measure implies that relative
and not absolute income variation matters, which fits with the observation that
different households face different needs and different income levels. The co-
efficient of variation is calculated for the households’ fishing incomes over the
three seasons. The theoretical model in section 3.2.2 postulates that the coeffi-
cient of variation is below one. This is the case in 93% of the contracts.
To test if interest rates from interlinked contracts increase with the relative
income variation, I interact the coefficient of variation V with a fish trader
dummy. The fish trader dummy is one if the credit contract is an interlinked
contract. I also include V and the fish trader dummy on their own to control for
their individual effects on the interest rate.
Furthermore, to analyze the special role of the fish trader with respect to trans-
action costs saving, I include a boat dummy interacted with a fish trader dummy.
The resulting dummy is one if the household has a boat and the loan is from a
fish trader. It tests if fish traders have a special position in allowing a fishing
boat as collateral. I also include a dummy that is one if the household has a boat
to control for the individual effect of boat ownership.
To sum up, I regress the interest rates from interlinked and pure credit con-
tracts on V, V interacted with a fish trader dummy, a fish trader dummy, a
boat dummy, the boat dummy interacted with a fish trader dummy as well as
on several controls. I control for the income level, loan properties, household
characteristics as well as the lender type.
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As fishing income volatility is correlated with the fishing income level, I include
the yearly fishing income level, i.e. the catch value of the fishing unit weighted
by the share the household receives, to control for this effect. This leads to
two additional problems. First, income may be endogenous as the loan could
be used to increase productivity and thus income. The included dummy that
equals one if the household owns a fishing boat controls for this effect. Second,
the cross-sectional data does not give income information for earlier years. In-
come data is based on 2010/11, while loans are taken out between 2006 and
2011 such that especially the conditions for earlier loans may be based on dif-
ferent incomes. As incomes seem to vary more between the sectors than over
the years, I include sector dummies. The sector may be more relevant than the
income of an individual year as incomes are uncertain and a certain year may
have been especially good or bad for the household so that the general produc-
tivity of the fishing grounds may matter more. The sector effects are estimated
as deviation from their mean, i.e. the sum of all sector effects is constrained to
equal zero.
In terms of loan properties, I include the loan size, the maturity and whether a
formal collateral secures the loan. The signs of the coefficients of the loan size
and of maturity are not clear. In the case of repeated lending or fixed costs, the
interest rates fall with the loan size and with maturity. Small loans with short
maturity are used as initial test on the credibility of a new borrower. Further-
more, for smaller loans or shorter maturity, fixed costs are distributed over a
smaller amount or a shorter time period, respectively. Contrary to that, a larger
amount and a longer maturity increase the default risk which leads to a posi-
tive relation. Maturity is measured in years and is only greater than zero if a
fixed repayment date exists such that the coefficient measures both the effect
of the length of the maturity and whether a fixed repayment date exists. I in-
clude a dummy that equals one if the household provides formal collateral for
the loan. Its coefficient should have a negative sign as a collateral reduces the
default risk. Still, some authors propose a positive relationship because lenders
increase the interest rate to appropriate the collateral in case of default.
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Household characteristics include literacy and subcaste. As the data does not
give information on whether any or how many literate people were part of the
household the year the loan was taken out, the dummy considers only the lit-
eracy of the household head. The dummy equals one if the household head is
literate. I further include dummy variables for the three most important sub-
castes as a measure for social networks.
Individual data on the specific lender is not available, but the survey gives in-
formation on the lender type, i.e. if the loan is from a money lender or a micro
finance institution. As the discussion in section 3.3.4 shows, business models
between the lender types differ substantially. The main variation in lender spe-
cific effects may thus depend more on the lender type and less on the individual
person. Given the available data, I therefore control for the lender type by in-
troducing fixed effects.
As one household can have more than one loan, certain regressors only vary
with the household level. To take the group structure of the error terms into
account, I use clustered error terms for the compuation of standard errors. The
estimated coefficients are not affected.
The fist column of Table 3.7, ‘OLS’, gives the results of the ordinary least square
(OLS) estimation with clustered error terms at the household level. The effect
of the coefficient of variation on the interest rate is in general negative and in-
significant, but positive and significant for interest rates from loans taken out
from a fish trader. First, this shows that income volatility only matters for the
interest rates of interlinked credit contracts. Second, it confirms the hypothe-
sis that interest rates from fish traders contain an insurance premium that is
increasing in the borrower’s income volatility. If the coefficient of variation is
increased by 1, the interlinked interest rate increases by 13.3 percentage points.
If the coefficient of variation is increased by its standard deviation of 0.35, the
interlinked interest rate increases by 4.7 percentage points. The results provide
empirical evidence for the theoretical result that interlinked contracts are a risk
sharing arrangement.
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TABLE 3.7: Estimation Results.
Interest rate p.a. OLS OLS(2) OLS(3) OLS(4) Treatreg > 2008
V -0.0156 -0.0170 -0.0152 -0.0183 -0.0157 -0.0431
(0.0285) (0.0284) (0.0285) (0.0286) (0.0276) (0.0342)
V × Fish Trader 0.1327∗∗ 0.1327∗∗ 0.1316∗∗ 0.1363∗∗ 0.1320∗∗ 0.1228
(0.0648) (0.0650) (0.0642) (0.0647) (0.0633) (0.0918)
Boat -0.0179 -0.0173 -0.0189 -0.0214 -0.0198 -0.0178
(0.0411) (0.0413) (0.0420) (0.0409) (0.0404) (0.0491)
Boat × Fish Trader -0.1963∗∗ -0.1970∗∗ -0.1960∗∗ -0.1936∗∗ -0.1947∗∗ -0.2118∗∗
(0.0840) (0.0840) (0.0842) (0.0840) (0.0819) (0.1007)
log(Fishing Income) -0.0318∗∗∗ -0.0321∗∗∗ -0.0320∗∗∗ -0.0302∗∗ -0.0319∗∗∗ -0.0330∗∗
(0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0117) (0.0119) (0.0115) (0.0136)
Sector 1 -0.0623∗∗∗ -0.0635∗∗∗ -0.0622∗∗∗ -0.0620∗∗∗ -0.0615∗∗∗ -0.0475∗∗
(0.0167) (0.0167) (0.0167) (0.0167) (0.0163) (0.0200)
Sector 2 -0.0213 -0.0195 -0.0204 -0.0226 -0.0203 -0.0184
(0.0196) (0.0198) (0.0191) (0.0196) (0.0190) (0.0224)
Sector 3 -0.0089 -0.0072 -0.0098 -0.0096 -0.0092 0.0180
(0.0221) (0.0222) (0.0223) (0.0221) (0.0215) (0.0244)
Sector 4 0.0925∗∗∗ 0.0902∗∗∗ 0.0924∗∗∗ 0.0943∗∗∗ 0.0911∗∗∗ 0.0480∗
(0.0249) (0.0250) (0.0249) (0.0245) (0.0245) (0.0246)
log(Maturity) -0.0320∗∗ -0.0320∗∗ -0.0264∗ -0.0318∗∗ -0.0425∗∗
(0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0143) (0.0144) (0.0189)
log(Loan Size) -0.0029 -0.0029 -0.0038 -0.0027 -0.0049
(0.0090) (0.0090) (0.0091) (0.0088) (0.0118)
if Collateral -0.0934∗ -0.0771 -0.0945∗ -0.0896∗ -0.1053∗∗
(0.0498) (0.0488) (0.0495) (0.0491) (0.0524)
Literacy 0.0134 0.0124 0.0133 0.0107 0.0137 0.0041
(0.0202) (0.0203) (0.0202) (0.0203) (0.0197) (0.0235)
Keuta 0.0634∗∗ 0.0639∗∗ 0.0630∗∗ 0.0724∗∗∗ 0.0622∗∗ 0.0423
(0.0274) (0.0279) (0.0272) (0.0274) (0.0271) (0.0279)
Kandara 0.0562 0.0567 0.0565 0.0641 0.0563 0.0467
(0.0460) (0.0466) (0.0460) (0.0465) (0.0449) (0.0467)
Khartia -0.0492 -0.0446 -0.0504 -0.0385 -0.0487 -0.0865∗∗
(0.0354) (0.0357) (0.0355) (0.0354) (0.0344) (0.0371)
Money Lender 0.0086 0.0223 0.0063 0.0155 0.0103 0.0068
(0.0638) (0.0646) (0.0638) (0.0653) (0.0636) (0.0723)
Fish Trader -0.0730 -0.0578 -0.0740 -0.0689 -0.0424 -0.0659
(0.1111) (0.1110) (0.1116) (0.1122) (0.1262) (0.1340)
Friends, . . . -0.0243 -0.0097 -0.0266 -0.0164 -0.0211 0.0030
(0.0686) (0.0689) (0.0687) (0.0699) (0.0688) (0.0764)
Bank -0.1541∗ -0.1616∗∗ -0.1563∗∗ -0.1631∗∗ -0.1547∗∗ -0.0932
(0.0788) (0.0805) (0.0783) (0.0804) (0.0771) (0.0972)
Micro Finance -0.0966 -0.1139∗ -0.0976 -0.0951 -0.0964 -0.1017
(0.0622) (0.0640) (0.0622) (0.0634) (0.0614) (0.0703)
Cooperative -0.2051∗∗∗ -0.2117∗∗∗ -0.2048∗∗∗ -0.2335∗∗∗ -0.2039∗∗∗ -0.2213∗∗∗
(0.0709) (0.0722) (0.0707) (0.0712) (0.0701) (0.0787)
Constant 0.8432∗∗∗ 0.7994∗∗∗ 0.8200∗∗∗ 0.8191∗∗∗ 0.8365∗∗∗ 0.9197∗∗∗
(0.1757) (0.1726) (0.1541) (0.1787) (0.1726) (0.2090)
n/Clusters 450/316 450/316 450/316 450/316 450/316 336/241
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Clustered standard errors in parenthesis, ∗∗∗: p<0.01, ∗∗: p<0.05, ∗: p<0.1.
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The ownership of a boat reduces the interest rate in general, but the effect is
only significant if the loan is from a fish trader. This highlights the special role
of the fish trader as credit provider and his ability to take a productive asset as
collateral. This may also explain why the average interest rate for interlinked
loans reported in Table 3.5 does not differ a lot from micro finance rates, even
though the former includes an insurance premium.
In general, securing the loan by a collateral significantly reduces the interest
rate. A higher fishing income - which can be interpreted as a collateral - also
significantly reduces the interest rates. The important role of collaterals and
especially of non-formal collaterals are in line with Menkhoff et al. (2012).
The negative signs of the ‘log loan size’-coefficient (not significant) and the ‘log
maturity’-coefficient (significant) imply that a larger loan amount and a larger
maturity reduce the interest rate. This fits the interpretation that fixed costs
play an important role and that distributing the fixed costs over a larger loan
amount and a longer repayment period reduces unit costs and thus the interest
rate.
Other than expected, a literate household head increases the interest rate, but
the effect is insignificant. A reason for this may be that literate people have
better job opportunities outside of fisheries, which may increase the probability
to migrate with default as an attractive option. If a household belongs to the
subcaste ‘Keuta’, it faces a significantly higher interest rate.
Only the sector dummies for sector 1 and 4, the Central and the Outer Channel
sector, respectively, are significant. Based on an F-test, the Null hypothesis that
all four coefficients are the same can be rejected (F(2,428)=1.99 with p=0.000).
This result means that the interest rates in the Central sector are significantly
higher than the average. Interest rates in the Outer Channel sector in turn are
significantly lower. As the Outer Channel sector seems to be the relatively less
connected and most backward sector with an average yearly fishing income of
less than 65% of the Central sector - the sector with the highest average yearly
fishing income - , this result fits the findings of Bhattacharjee and Rajeev (2010)
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that less developed areas face higher interest rates and of Shami (2012) that
more connected areas reduce the exploitive nature of interlinkages.
The constant can be interpreted as the yearly interest rate from non-specified
sources, all dummies being zero, while the effects of maturity, loan amount and
of the fishing income still have to be subtracted. In the OLS estimation, the base-
line interest rate is 84.3% p.a., which is above the mean interest rates reported
in Table 3.5, as the effects just mentioned have not yet been incorporated.
The lender fixed effects capture all unobserved lender dependent influences. In
other words, they report the lender specific interest rate differences that can not
be attributed to one of the included regressors.
3.4.2 Alternative Model Specifications
The particular concern with the estimation is that the data gives equilibrium
outcomes. It is not clear if one observes the credit supply or the credit demand
curve or a combination of both such that a simultaneous equation model of
credit supply and demand may be more appropriate. As the focus is on the
interest rate formation based on the supply side, the concern is the possible en-
dogeneity of the loan amount. One could argue that the specification of the
collateral as well as the loan maturity are also simultaneously determined with
the interest rate and the loan amount. To check results, I estimate the model
by consecutively leaving out ‘maturity’, ‘loan amount’ and ‘collateral’. As re-
sults do not change a lot (see Table 3.7 columns OLS(2), OLS(3), and OLS(4)),
endogeneity of the variables does not seem to cause problems.
To confirm that a possible endogeneity of the loan amount does not cause prob-
lems, I additionally estimate a model where I use the loan purposes as instru-
ments for the loan amount. The loan purposes are exogenous variables on the
demand side that do not appear on the supply side. The estimation procedure
and results are given in Appendix C.1. Again, results do not provide evidence
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for an endogeneity problem. Furthermore, the evidence for an insurance pre-
mium remains, namely, the effect of the coefficient of variation if the loan is
from a fish trader is still positive and significant.
One could argue that the Heckit method (Heckman, 1976; Wooldridge, 2010)
should be applied because interest rates of debt free households are not ob-
served. If the aim of the study was to explain a household specific interest rate,
one should indeed take the possibility of a selection bias into account. House-
holds may not hold loans because no one is willing to lend to them. In this
study, I explicitly want to explain different interest rates for the same house-
hold such that I take the credit contracts and not the households as observation
units. As there are infinitely many credit contracts that did not materialize and
with no available information I concentrate on observed credit contracts.
Another concern is that the households self-select into an insurance, i.e. into an
interlinked credit-fish contract. If the insurance choice is endogenous, it should
be modeled directly. Otherwise, the impact of the insurance on the interest rate
will be biased. For contracts that entail insurance, households may be willing to
pay a higher interest rate. I re-estimate the model with a treatment effect where
the insurance choice is explained with a probit model. As one household may
have multiple loans, the question is not if the household chooses insurance in
general but why it chooses insurance in combination with a specific loan.
To explain why the household chooses insurance in combination with a specific
loan, I include the following variables in the probit model:
• One important reason may be the loan purpose. If a loan is taken out
in case of an emergency, insurance probably does not matter. In turn,
investment in fishing activities may lead to unforeseeable changes in in-
come flows calling for insurance. I thus include one dummy variable that
equals one if the loan purpose is fishing activities and a second dummy
variable that equals one if the loan was taken out due to emergencies.
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• To consider the role of income volatility for an insurance choice, I also
include V even though it is not loan but household specific. I thus expect
its effect on the insurance choice to be low.
Estimation results are similar to the OLS results (see Table 3.7 column ‘treatreg’).
The correlation between the error of the regression equation and the error of
the selection equation is ρ = −0.1158. The likelihood ratio tests that the equa-
tions are independent (ρ = 0) indicates that there is no problem of endogenous
selection (Prob>Chi2 = 0.5666). Furthermore, the effect of the coefficient of
variation on the probability to choose an interlinked contract is positive, but
insignificant.
To check if the time difference between income information and receipt of the
credit matters, I estimate the model by only using loans taken out more recently,
i.e. after 2008. The coefficient of the relative income variation if the loan is from
a fish trader is still positive and of a similar size as before, but not significant
anymore (see Table 3.7 column ‘>2008’). This means that the effect within the
sample is as before, but that the result does not carry over to the whole popula-
tion. This may be due to the smaller sample size.
As a last robustness check, I include a dummy that is one if the household head
has an alternative income source in addition to fishing. This is relevant for
19.3% of the credit contracts. An additional income source may depict another
way of smoothing income flows making an insurance via an interlinked con-
tract unnecessary. Appendix C.2 reports results, which are similar to the base-
line results. The effect of the dummy is positive, but insignificant. The sign is
unexpected, as one would assume that income alternatives reduce default risk.
Around Chilika lagoon though, incomes outside of fisheries may rather be a
sign for low fishing incomes and thus a sign for a higher default risk.
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3.5 Conclusion
Even though traders provide the lion’s share of informal credits, their inter-
est rate formation has received little empirical attention. The main theoretical
explanation for interlinked credit-output contracts is risk sharing. This paper
provides empirical evidence for that hypothesis by showing that income risk
matters for interest rates from interlinked contracts. It calculates the implicit in-
terest rates of interlinked credit-fish contracts. Empirical estimations show that
these interest rates contain an insurance premium. In other words, borrowers
pay an interest rate mark-up to the lender for sharing the risk. The insurance
premium increases with the borrower’s income volatility.
In addition, the analysis shows that fish traders are able to take fishing boats
as collateral, while other lenders are not. This stresses the special position of
the traders and illustrates transaction costs savings. It further explains why the
level of interlinked interest rates compares to micro finance rates, even though
interlinked rates include an insurance premium.
The results highlight that interlinked credit contracts in contrast to pure credit
contracts provide an important additional service in the case of missing mar-
kets, namely insurance. Still, the theoretical model showed that pure credit
contracts have an important role for limiting interest rates of interlinked con-
tracts because they exhibit the exit option to interlinked contracts.
Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Overview Units
TABLE A.1: Overview Units.
Abbreviation Explanation
$ 2005 US dollars
GtC giga tons carbon
kgC kilograms carbon
Gtoe giga tons oil equivalent
kgoe kilograms oil equivalent
a annum
◦C degree Celsius
∆◦C from 1900 degree Celsius difference from temperature level in the year 1900
Note that $/kgC = 1012$/GtC.
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A.2 Calibration
TABLE A.2: Overview Variables
Symbol Explanation Value Unit Source
C consumption 1012 $ /a endogenous
E in 2005 emissions
from land use
change
1.1 GtC/a Nordhaus (2008b),
see note 1
R in 2005 extracted car-
bon resource
flow = emis-
sions
7.7578 GtC/a EIA (2010), IEA
(2007), see note 2
M1 in
1750
carbon mass in
atmosphere
596.4 GtC Nordhaus (2008b),
Nordhaus (2010b)
M1 in
2005
carbon mass in
atmosphere
808 GtC Nordhaus (2010b)
M2 in
2005
carbon mass in
upper ocean
1600 GtC Nordhaus (2010b)
M3 in
2005
carbon mass in
lower ocean
10010 GtC Nordhaus (2010b)
PM shadow prices
carbon stocks
utils/GtC endogenous
PT shadow prices
of tempera-
tures
utils/∆◦C
from 1900
endogenous
PK shadow price
of capital stock
utils/
1012 $
endogenous
PS shadow price
of carbon stock
utils/GtC endogenous
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q in 2005 carbon flow
price
0.3415 $/kgC EIA (2010), see note
3
v netto carbon
flow price
$/kgC endogenous
ι∗ steady state in-
terest rate
0.042 1/a see note 4
S in 2005 carbon stock 612;
3000;
6000
GtC see section 1.3
T1 in
2005
global mean
surface tem-
perature
0.83 ∆◦C from
1900
Nordhaus (2010b)
T2 in
2005
temperature
lower ocean
0.0068 ∆◦C from
1900
Nordhaus (2010b)
U overall utility present
value
utils
endogenous
u instantaneous
utility
utils/a endogenous
Y in 2005 GDP 45.23 1012$/a Worldbank (2009)
r tax rate $/kgC endogenous
h relative in-
tertemporal
equivalent
variation
1 endogenous
W absolute in-
tertemp. equiv.
variation
1012$ endogenous
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TABLE A.3: Parameters Taken from Literature
Symbol Explanation Value Unit Source
Γ carbon
transition
matrix

−0.0120 0.0047 0
0.0120 −0.0052 0.0001
0 0.0005 −0.0001
 1/a Nordhaus (2010b),
see note 5
δ depreciation
rate
0.05 1/a Barro and Sala-i
Martin (2004)
α income
fraction
capital
0.33 1 Barro and Sala-i
Martin (2004, page
58)
θ inverse
of the
intertem-
poral
elasticity
of substitu-
tion
1.5 1 Nordhaus (2010b)
Λ temperature
interaction
matrix
 −0.0345 0.0066
0.0050 −0.0050
 1/a Nordhaus (2010b),
see note 7
ρ time prefer-
ence rate
0.015 1/a Nordhaus (2010b)
TABLE A.4: Calibrated Parameters
Symbol Explanation Value Unit Source
K in
2005
capital
stock
1012$ Calibration: Kˆ(2005) =
Yˆ(2005)
β income
fraction
resource
0.058 1 Calibration: q2005R2005Y2005 ,
see note 2
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λ rate of tech-
nological
progress
0.0134 1/a Barro and Sala-i Mar-
tin (2004) (page 13), see
note 8
γ scaler ex-
traction
costs
see section 1.3
e exponent
extraction
costs
0; 1; 1.6 1 see section 1.3
TABLE A.5: Functions
Symbol Explanation Value Unit Source
Π(M1, t) radiative
forcing
η1 log
(
M1(t)
M1in1750
)
+
η2FEX
◦C/a Nordhaus (2010b), see
note 6
Ω(T1) damage
function
b
1+ξ1T1+ξ2T
ξ3
1
Nordhaus (2008b), see
note 9
k(S) extraction
cost func-
tion
γS−e $/kgC see section 1.3
Notes
1. Total emissions in GtC/a are R + E with E = E(0)e−.0101t. The value
of carbon emissions from land use change in t = 0, i.e. in 2005, is 1.1
GtC/a (Nordhaus, 2008b). Division by 10 adjusts the original value 11
GtC from per decade to per year. The yearly shrinking rate of the emis-
sions from land use change is also taken from Nordhaus (2008b) and trans-
formed into its continuous time yearly counterpart, i.e. from (1− 0.1)t−1
to log(1− 0.01) = −.0101.
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2. Data on resource flows and stocks as well as on emissions are based on
IEA (2007). Because the model uses only one carbonic resource, we merge
the data on oil, coal and gas, and convert units into giga tons of carbon,
GtC.
3. The resource price q in 2005 is a weighted average of the average 2005
prices for oil, steam coal and natural gas in $/kgoe, 0.3562, 0.0964 and
0.3109, respectively. The coal and gas price are roughly estimated aver-
age prices 2005 from IEA (2007), while the oil price is the average of the
‘Weekly All Countries Spot Price FOB Weighted by Estimated Export Vol-
ume’ (EIA, 2010). We take the shares of each resource in total resource
consumption 2005 as weights and convert the units into $/kgC. The calcu-
lation yields q = 0.3415 in $/kgC.
4. The steady state interest rate of the model is ι∗ = 0.042 1/a. This is close to
the average interest rate of the countries listed at Inter-Agency Group on
Economic and Financial Statistics (IAG) (2010). Barro (1987) finds an av-
erage interest rate of 3.45 % 1/a for the UK for 1729-1918, Eurostat (2011)
states an average interst rate of 4.33 % 1/a for 2001-2010, Mendoza (1991)
and Oviedo (2005) use 4 % 1/a as a world interst rate, but Oviedo (2005)
cites studies that use an interest rate up to 14.9 % 1/a. The interest rate
in the DICE model is 5-6 % 1/a. Thus, our model yields a sensible steady
state interest rate.
5. We calculate the carbon transition matrix according to Γ = B1−I10 using its
discrete time counterpart, say B1, in Nordhaus (2010b) , with
B1 =

−0.0120 0.0047 0
0.0120 −0.0052 0.0001
0 0.0005 −0.0001
 ,
I is the identity matrix. B1 − I is divided by 10 because one period in the
DICE model corresponds to a decade.
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6. FEX is the exogenous radiative forcing in watt/m2. It linearly increases
from -0.06 to 0.3 watt/m2 within 100 years and stays constant afterwards.
The parameter values η1 = 0.1206 ◦C/a and η2 = 0.022 (◦C/a)( m2/watts)
are based on Nordhaus (2008b, 2010b) and adjusted to the time scale, i.e.
the value given by Nordhaus divided by 10.
7. We calculate the temperature interaction matrix according to Λ = B2−I10
using its discrete time counterpart, say B2, in Nordhaus (2010b), with
B2 =
 .6553 .0660
.05 0.95
 .
As before, we divide by 10 because one period in the DICE model corre-
sponds to a decade.
8. The rate of technological progress is calibrated to match a steady state
growth rate of 1.8 % 1/a. Barro and Sala-i Martin (2004) (page 13) find an
average per capita growth rate of 1.9% 1/a for major developed countries
for over a century. For g = 0.018 = λ−ρβ1−α−β+βθ based on qˆ
∗ = ι∗ meaning
that k(S) grows slower than p in the long run, the rate of technological
progress is λ = 0.018(1− α− β+ βθ) + ρβ = 0.0134 1/a.
9. We take the parameters ξ1 = 0.0018, ξ2 = 0.0023 and ξ3 = 2 from Nord-
haus (2010b), while we use the scaler b to ensure Y(0) = Y¯.
Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Derivation of the Five Credit Regimes
From the Kuhn-Tucker conditions (2.5) and definition (2.6) follows
(A) v = 0 or f = τ +
λ3
λ2
(B) z = 0 or f = ι
(C) s = 0 or f = φ
(D) λ3 = 0 or v = k. (B.1)
Table B.1 list the 16 possible combinations between A,B,C and D and shows that
only five combinations (TL, EL, OL, NO and SA) do not lead to contradictions.
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1. R1: f = ι and f = φ (B=1 and C=1) is not possible since ι 6= φ.
2. R2: f = τ + λ3 and f = φ (A=1 and C=1) is not possible since τ > φ and
λ3 ≥ 0.
3. R3: λ3 = 0 and f = ι (B=1 and D=0) is not possible since λ3 > 0 is needed
to fulfill ι = f ≤ τ + λ3 and ι > τ.
4. R4: v = 0 and v = k is not optimal because it implies k = 0 which is ruled
out by the Inada conditions.
B.2 Relation between Household’s Discount Factor,
Credit Market Regimes and Initial Wealth Level
We show that f (κ) is a non-increasing continuous function in R+0. Define
Z(κ) = supc1,c2,q{u(c1, c2)|c1 − g1(q) ≤ κ, c2 − g2(q) ≤ 0, q ≥ 0} with the
vector q of an arbitrary dimension. Furthermore, g1 = h + v + z − k − s and
g2 = h + w + φs − τv − ιz, both concave, such that Z is also concave. Take
f (κ) := u1u2 , evaluated at (c
∗
1 , c
∗
2) for which the supremum is attained.
Consider Z˜(κ) = u(c1, c∗2) with c1 = κ + g1(q∗). Then, Z(κ) ≥ Z˜(κ) with
equality for κ = κ∗, and Z˜′(κ∗) = u1(c∗1 , c
∗
2). Hence, Z
′
+(κ
∗) ≥ u1(c∗1 , c∗2) ≥
Z′−(κ∗). Furthermore, as Z is concave, Z′−(κ∗) ≥ Z′+(κ∗). Therefore,
Z′+(κ∗) = Z′−(κ∗) = u1(c∗1 , c
∗
2).
u1
u2
is increasing in u1 due to linear homogeneity of u such that it is non-increasing
in κ. The rest follows from the credit regimes definition.
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B.3 Derivation of Equation (2.8)
To determine the sign of dl/di with i ∈ {ι, τ, φ}we use the implicit function the-
orem and Cramer’s Rule, i.e. dl/di = |H j,i|/|H j| for j ∈ {TL, EL, OL, NO, SA}
and the Jacobian matrix given by
H j =
y∗ll y∗lk
y∗kl y
∗
kk

and
H j,i =
−y∗li y∗lk
−y∗ki y∗kk

with i ∈ {ι, τ, φ}, j ∈ {TL, EL, OL, NO, SA} and the Lagrangian at the opti-
mum y∗ (see equation (2.4)). A locally unambiguously defined optimum im-
plies |H j| > 01 such that the denominator only influences the size of the effect
but not the direction and equation (2.8) determines the sign.
B.4 Proofs for Table 2.1
We use (2.8) and (2.7) to determine the direction of change of labor reallocation
to low-skilled work as a response of rising interest factors.
Proof of dl j/dι:
TL: For j = TL and f = ι:
sgn
(
dlTL
dι
)
= sgn((hkhlk − hlhkk)(1+ ι)). (B.2)
1The objective function is concave if and only if the Hessian Matrix is semi definite (|H j| ≥
0). We assume a locally unambiguously defined optimum. Then, |H j| = 0 occurs with proba-
bility zero.
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For a linear homogenous production function the ratio of the marginal produc-
tivities is only a function of the factor input ratio such that
d(hk/hl)
d(k/l)
k/l
hk/hl
=
d(hk/hl)
dk
l
k/l
hk/hl
.
The inverse elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in low-skilled
production, σ, can therefore be represented by
1
σ
= −d ln(hk/hl)
d ln(k/l)
= −d ln(hk/hl)
d ln(k)
= −d ln(hk)
d ln(k)
+
d ln(hl)
d ln(k)
= k
(
hlk
hl
− hkk
hk
)
= l
(
hlk
hk
− hll
hl
)
.
Using the Euler equation hkk + hl l = h and its first derivative with respect to k
yields
1
σ
=
hlkh
hlhk
(B.3)
Multiplying both sides of (B.2) with k/[(1+ ι)hkhl] and using (B.3) gives
sgn
(
dlTL
dι
)
= sgn
(
1
σ
)
.
EL,OL,NO,SA: For j ∈ {EL, OL, NO, SA} and f = ι, y∗lι = y∗kι = 0 such that
dl j/dι = 0.
Proof of dl j/dτ:
TL: For j = TL and f = ι:
sgn
(
dlTL
dτ
)
= sgn(−hlk(1+ ι)).
EL: For j = EL and f = τ + λ3/λ2:
sgn
(
dlEL
dτ
)
= sgn ( fτ(hkhlk − hlhkk)(1+ f )− hlk(1+ f )− fkhl) . (B.4)
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The inverse elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption can be ex-
pressed by
1
η
=
d ln(u1/u2)
d ln(c2/c1)
=
fc2c2
f
=
fc1c1
f
= −u22c2
u2
= −u11c1
u1
. (B.5)
The derivation of this expression is analogous to (B.3).
Calculate
fk =
u2u11hk − u1u22(hk − τ)
u22
=
u11hk
u2
u1c1
u1c1
− u1u22(hk − τ)c2
u2u2c2
.
Inserting the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and f = u1u2 gives
fk = − f hkηc1
c2
c2
+ f
hk − τ
ηc2
.
Replacing hk − τ by − f hk from (2.7) yields
fk = − f hkηc1
c2
c2
− f f hk
ηc2
.
Inserting fc2 = f /(ηc2) from (B.5) yields
fk = − fc2hk( c2c1 + f ).
The derivative of the subjective discount factor with respect to the interest factor
τ can be expressed as
fτ =
u1u22k
u22
= − fc2k.
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Multiply (B.4) by 1/(hlhk), use the elasticity of substitution (B.3) and insert fk =
− fc2hk(c2/c1 + f ) and fτ = − fc2k to attain
sgn
(
dl
dτ
)
= sgn
(
fτ(
hlk
hl
− hkk
hk
)(1+ f )− hlk
hlhk
(1+ f )− fk
hk
)
)
= sgn
(
− fc2k(hlkhl −
hkk
hk
)(1+ f )− hlk
hlhk
(1+ f ) + fc2(
c2
c1
+ f )
)
= sgn
(
− fc2
σ
(1+ f )− 1+ f
hσ
+ fc2( f +
c2
c1
)
)
.
Multiply with σ/( fc2(1+ f )) and re-arrange to attain
sgn
(
dl
dτ
)
= sgn
(
−(1+ 1
h fc2
) + σ
f + c2c1
1+ f
)
= sgn
(
σ
f + c2c1
1+ f
− 1− ηc2
h f
)
)
.
OL: For j = OL and f = τ:
sgn
(
dlOL
dτ
)
= sgn((hkhlk − hlhkk)(1+ τ)− hlk(1+ τ)). (B.6)
Multiplying (B.6) with ((1+ τ)hlkhk)
−1 leads to
sgn
(
dl
dτ
)
= sgn
(
1− hlhkk
hlkhk
− 1
hk
)
.
Note that the first order condition for capital in (2.7) leads to
1
hk
=
1
τ
+ 1. (B.7)
Now insert the first derivation of the Euler equation of the production function
(see (B.3)) and (B.7) to attain
sgn
(
dl
dτ
)
= sgn
(
hl l
khk
− 1
τ
)
= sgn
(
τ − khk
lhl
)
= sgn
(
τ − 1− α
α
)
.
NO,SA: For j ∈ {NO, SA} and f = τ, y∗lτ = y∗kτ = 0 such that dl j/dτ = 0.
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Proof of dl j/dφ:
TL,EL,OL,NO: For j ∈ {TL, EL, OL, NO} and f = φ,y∗lφ = y∗kφ = 0 such that
dl j/dφ = 0.
SA: The derivation of dlSA/dφ is equivalent to dlOL/dτ, i.e.
sgn
(
dl
dφ
)
= sgn
(
φ
1− α
α
)
.
B.5 Proofs for Table 2.2
We use (2.8) and (2.13) to determine the direction of change of labor reallocation
to low-skilled work as a response of rising interest factors.
Proof of dl j/dι:
TL: For j =TL and f = ι:
sgn
(
dlTL
dι
)
= sgn (hkx(hlkx + hlxk)(1+ ι)− hlx(hkkx + hkxk)(1+ ι))
= sgn ((hkxhlkx− hlxhkkx)(1+ ι) + (hkxhlxk − hlxhkxk)(1+ ι))
= sgn ((hkxhlkx− hlxhkkx)(1+ ι)) ,
which is equivalent to
sgn
(
dlTL
dι
)
= sgn
(
1
σ
)
.
EL, OL, NO, SA: For j ∈ {EL, OL, NO, SA} and f = ι,y∗lι = y∗kι = 0 such that
dl j/dι = 0.
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Proof of dl j/dτ:
TL: For j=TL and f = τ:
sgn
(
dlTL
dτ
)
= sgn(−hlkx(1+ ι)− hlxk(1+ ι)).
Multiplication with k/[(1+ ι)hlx] gives
sgn
(
dlTL
dτ
)
= sgn
(
−hlk khl − xk
k
x
)
.
Expansion by hhk/(hhk) yields
sgn
(
dlTL
dτ
)
= sgn
(
−hlk khl
hhk
hhk
− xk kx
hhk
hhk
)
.
Replacing xk by xhhk, multiplying by h/(hkk) and usig the elasticity (B.3) and
(2.14) gives
sgn
(
dlTL
dτ
)
= sgn
(
hk
k
h
(
− hhlk
hlhk
− xh hx
))
= sgn
(
− 1
σ
+ ε
)
EL: For j=EL and f = τ + λ3/λ2:
sgn
(
dlEL
dτ
)
(B.8)
= sgn (− fτhl x[(1+ f )(hkkx + hkxk) + fkhkx] + (hkx fτ − 1)[(1+ f )(hlkx + hl xk) + fkhl x])
= sgn(− fτhl x(1+ f )hkkx− fτhl x(1+ f )hkxk − fτhl x fkhkx + hkx fτ(1+ f )hlkx
+ hkx fτ(1+ f )hl xk + hkx fτ fkhl x− (1+ f )hlkx− (1+ f )hl xk − fkhl x)
= sgn (− fτhl x(1+ f )hkkx + hkx fτ(1+ f )hlkx− (1+ f )hlkx− (1+ f )hl xk − fkhl x)
= sgn
(
− fτx2(1+ f )(hkkhl − hkhlk)− (1+ f )hlkx− (1+ f )hl xk − fkhl x
)
. (B.9)
Calculate
fτ =
ku22u1
u22
= − k f
ηc2
(B.10)
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and
fk =
u2u11(hkx + hxk)− u1u22(hkx + hxk − τ)
u22
=
u11(hkx + hxk)u1c1
u2u1c1
− f u22(hkx + hxk − τ)c2
u2c2
= − f
η
(hkx + hxhhk)
c1
+
f
η
(hkx + hxhhk − τ)
c2
=
f hk
η
(x + hxh)
(
− 1
c1
+
1
c2
)
− f τ
ηc2
. (B.11)
Multiply (B.8) with (hlhkx2(1 + f ))−1, rearrange (B.3) to get hkkhl − hkhlk =
−hhlk/k and (2.13) to obtain hkx(1 + f ) = τ and insert both expressions to-
gether with (B.11) and (B.10) in (B.8), replace xk by xhhk and rearrange (B.8) to
obtain
sgn
(
dlEL
dτ
)
(B.12)
= sgn
(
fτhhlk
hlhkk
− hlk
hlhkx
− xk
hkx2
− fk
(1+ f )hkx
)
= sgn
(
− f hhlk
ηc2hlhk
− hlk
hlhkx
− xk
hkx2
− f hk
η(1+ f )hkx
(x + hxh)
(
− 1
c1
+
1
c2
)
+
f τ
ηc2(1+ f )hkx
)
= sgn
(
− f
ηc2σ
− 1
σhx
+
ε
xh
− f (x + hxh)
η(1+ f )x
(
− 1
c1
+
1
c2
)
+
f τ
ηc2(1+ f )hkx
)
= sgn
(
− f
ηc2σ
− σ
−1 − ε
hx
− f (1− ε)
η(1+ f )
(
c1 − c2
c1c2
)
+
f
ηc2
)
= sgn
(
f
ηc2
(
− 1
σ
− 1− ε
1+ f
(
c1 − c2
c1
)
+ 1
)
− σ
−1 − ε
hx
)
. (B.13)
Multiply with σηc2/ f and ’isolate‘ ε to attain
sgn
(
σ
(
f + c2c2
1+ f
)
− ηc2
f hx
− 1+ εσ
(
ηc2
f hx
+
1− c2c1
1+ f
))
.
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OL: For j = EL and f = τ
sgn
(
dlOL
dτ
)
= sgn (−hlx(hkkx + hkxk)(1+ τ) + (hkx− 1)(hlkx + hlxk)(1+ τ))
= sgn ((−hlxhkkx− hlxhkxk + hkxhlkx + hkxhlxk − hlkx− hlxk)(1+ τ))
= sgn ((−hlxhkkx + hkxhlkx− hlkx− hlxk)(1+ τ))
= sgn
(
−[x2(hlhkk − hkhlk) + hlkx + hlxk](1+ τ)
)
.
Use then the relationship hkkhl − hkhlk = −hhlk/k from (B.3) and the elasticity
of substitution, insert xk = xhhk and divide by hlx, hkx and (1+ τ) to obtain
sgn
(
dlOL
dτ
)
= sgn
(
hhlk
hkhlk
− hlk
hlhkx
− xk
hkx2
)
= sgn
(
σ−1
(
1
k
− 1
hx
)
− xk
hkx2
)
= sgn
([
σ−1
(
hx
k
− 1
)
− xhhkhx
hkx2
])
= sgn
([
σ−1
(
hx
k
− 1
)
+ ε
])
.
Using the output elasticity of capital 1 − α and the relation hkx = τ/(1 + τ)
from (2.13) yields
sgn
(
dlOL
dτ
)
= sgn
(
1
σ
(
τ
(1− α)(1+ τ) − 1
)
+ ε
)
.
Multiply with σ to attain
sgn
(
dlOL
dτ
)
= sgn
(
τ
(1− α)(1+ τ) − 1+ εσ
)
.
NO,SA: For j ∈ {NO, SA} and f = τ, y∗lτ = y∗kτ = 0 such that dl j/dτ = 0.
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Proof of dl j/dφ:
TL, EL, OL, NO: For j ∈ {TL, EL, OL, NO} and f = φ, y∗lφ = y∗kφ = 0 such that
dl j/dφ = 0.
SA: The derivation of dlSA/dφ is equivalent to dlOL/dτ, i.e.
sgn(dlSA/dφ) = sgn(φ/[σ(1− α)(1+ φ)]− ε).
Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Instrumental Variable Estimation
As additional robustness check, I estimate a model where I use the loan pur-
poses as instruments for the loan amount to check for simultaneity. The loan
purposes are exogenous variables on the demand side that do not appear on
the supply side. Statistical tests support the validity of the instruments: First,
as suggested by Baum et al. (2007) for clustered error terms, I use the Wald
F-statistic based on the Kleibergen-Paap rk statistic to test for weak identifi-
cation. Following the ‘rule of thumb’ that the F-statistic should be at least 10
to avoid weak instruments (Baum et al., 2007; Staiger and Stock, 1997), the evi-
dence suggest that the model does not have a problem of weak instruments (see
Table C.1). Second, the instrumental variables should be independent from the
unobservable error process, which in the case of intra-cluster correlation can be
tested with the J-statistic (Baum et al., 2003). Based on the calculated J-statistic
(see Table C.1), the Null-hypothesis that all instruments are exogenous cannot
be rejected. I conclude that all instruments are valid.
I now estimate the model with the Two-Stage Least Square (2SLS) technique as
well as the 2-step GMM approach proposed by Baum et al. (2007) for efficient
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n 450
Kleinbergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic 34.276
Overidentification test all instruments
Hansen J-statistic 2.578
Chi sq (12) p-value 0.8597
Test of endogeneity (h0: variables exogenous)
Robust regression F F(1,315)
=2.178
P-value 0.141
TABLE C.1: Statistics Instrumental Variable Estimations
estimates. I again adjust standard errors for clustering. If the loan amount is ex-
ogenous, the instrumental variable estimation is still consistent, but inefficient
relative to OLS estimation. As the statistical test suggests a valid instrumen-
tal variable estimation, I can now test if ‘loan amount’ is indeed endogenous.
Based on a regression based test (StataCorp., 2013; Rao et al., 1995), the Null-
hypothesis that all variables are exogenous cannot be rejected (see Table C.1).
The first column of table C.2 again gives the OLS results and the next two
columns (GMM and 2SLS) give the instrumental variable estimation results.
Other than before, sector specific effects are not constraint to sum up to zero,
such that one sector dummy is omitted, i.e. its effect is part of the constant.
The effect of income volatility on the interlinked interest rate is similar to the
OLS-results.
APPENDIX C 104
TABLE C.2: OLS, GMM and 2SLS Estimation Results.
Interest rate p.a. OLS GMM 2SLS
V -0.0156 -0.0289 -0.0255
(0.0285) (0.0264) (0.0280)
V × Fish Trader 0.133∗∗ 0.162∗∗ 0.162∗∗
(0.0648) (0.0754) (0.0778)
Boat -0.0179 -0.00450 0.00625
(0.0411) (0.0366) (0.0394)
Boat × Fish Trader -0.196∗∗ -0.205∗∗ -0.205∗∗
(0.0840) (0.0840) (0.0847)
log(Fishing Income) -0.0318∗∗∗ -0.0284∗∗ -0.0262∗∗
(0.0118) (0.0119) (0.0126)
Sector 1 -0.155∗∗∗ -0.153∗∗∗ -0.157∗∗∗
(0.0345) (0.0329) (0.0334)
Sector 2 -0.114∗∗∗ -0.129∗∗∗ -0.140∗∗∗
(0.0375) (0.0374) (0.0426)
Sector 3 -0.101∗∗ -0.0884∗∗ -0.0817∗∗
(0.0407) (0.0392) (0.0403)
log (Maturity) -0.0320∗∗ -0.0339∗∗ -0.0315∗∗
(0.0145) (0.0144) (0.0150)
log (Loan Size) -0.00286 -0.0562 -0.0754
(0.00904) (0.0277) (0.0500)
if Collateral -0.0934∗ -0.0765 -0.0664
(0.0498) (0.0564) (0.0599)
Literacy 0.0134 0.0162 0.0163
(0.0202) (0.0208) (0.0210)
Keuta 0.0634∗∗ 0.0720∗∗ 0.0737∗∗
(0.0274) (0.0288) (0.0301)
Kandara 0.0562 0.0511 0.0465
(0.0460) (0.0469) (0.0480)
Khartia -0.0492 -0.0220 -0.0194
(0.0354) (0.0390) (0.0427)
Money Lender 0.00856 0.0599 0.0660
(0.0638) (0.0674) (0.0757)
Fish Trader -0.0730 -0.0526 -0.0499
(0.111) (0.112) (0.115)
Friends, ... -0.0243 0.0241 0.0337
(0.0686) (0.0713) (0.0793)
Bank -0.154∗ -0.108 -0.0965
(0.0788) (0.0816) (0.0888)
Micro Finance -0.0966 -0.0755 -0.0723
(0.0622) (0.0623) (0.0661)
Cooperative -0.205∗∗∗ -0.208∗∗∗ -0.211∗∗∗
(0.0709) (0.0715) (0.0744)
Constant 0.936∗∗∗ 1.377∗∗∗ 1.526∗∗∗
(0.180) (0.270) (0.439)
n/Clusters 450/316 450/316 450/316
(Centered) R2 0.2789 0.2338 0.1963
Clustered standard errors in parenthesis, ∗∗∗: p<0.01, ∗∗: p<0.05, ∗: p<0.1.
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C.2 Estimation Results with Extra-Activity Dummy
TABLE C.3: Results with Extra-Activity Dummy
Interest rate p.a. OLS Coeff. (Std. Error)
V -0.0184 (0.02969)
V × Fish Trader 0.1338∗∗ (0.0653)
Boat -0.0198 (0.0414)
Boat × Fish Trader -0.1957∗∗ (0.0841)
log(Fishing Income) -0.0307∗∗ (0.0124)
Sector 1 -0.0619∗∗∗ (0.0168)
Sector 2 -0.0226 (0.0193)
Sector 3 -0.0073 (0.0223)
Sector 4 0.0918∗∗∗ (0.0253)
log(Maturity) -0.0316∗∗ (0.0145)
log(Loan Size) -0.0027 (0.009)
if Collateral -0.0929∗ (0.0496)
Literacy 0.0124 (0.0206)
Keuta 0.0627∗∗ (0.0272)
Kandara 0.0553 (0.0461)
Khartia -0.051 (0.0353)
Money Lender 0.0073 (0.0641)
Fish Trader -0.0762 (0.1119)
Friends, . . . -0.0272 (0.0695)
Bank -0.1558∗∗ (0.0791)
Micro Finance -0.0992 (0.0629)
Cooperative -0.2076∗∗∗ (0.0718)
Dummy Activity 0.0102 (0.024)
Constant 0.8334∗∗∗ (0.1781)
n/Clusters 450/316
Clustered standard errors in parenthesis, ∗∗∗: p<0.01, ∗∗: p<0.05, ∗: p<0.1.
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